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 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
 VOL. 95 APRIL 1995 NO. 3
 HISTORY "LITE" IN MODERN AMERICAN
 CONSTITUTIONALISM
 Martin S. Flaherty*
 Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be
 appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.
 The Federalist No. 6
 INTRODUCTION
 Americans love to invoke history, but not necessarily to learn it. Typ-
 ical, perhaps transcendental, in this regard was Ronald Reagan, who glo-
 ried in blithely rendered historical misstatements.2 What applies to
 * Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. B.A. 1981, Princeton University;
 M.A 1982, M. Phil. 1987, Yale University; J.D. 1988, Columbia Law School.
 Earlier versions of this article were presented to the Fordham Faculty Works-in-
 Progress Colloquium and the New York University Legal History Colloquium. I would like
 to thank Bruce Ackerman, Richard Bernstein, Jon Butler, Chris Eisgruber, Jill Fisch, James
 Fleming, Robert Kaczorowski, James Kainen, Larry Kramer, William La Piana, Frank
 Michelman, Edmund S. Morgan, William Nelson, Liam O'Melinn, Russell Pearce, John
 Phillip Reid, Dan Richman, William Michael Treanor, Mark Tushnet, and Lloyd Weinreb
 for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. My thanks as well to Richard Epstein and
 Cass Sunstein for useful and constructive exchanges as they prepared their published
 responses. Finally, I would like to record my debt to Zain E. Hussain and Hwan-Hui Helen
 Lee for invaluable research assistance.
 1. The Federalist No. 6, at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
 2. President Reagan, for example, once spoke of how the desegregation of America's
 military came about "'in World War II ... largely under the leadership of generals like
 MacArthur and Eisenhower'." James D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting
 Performance in the White House 495 (3d ed. 1985). Recounting one memorable scene,
 the President stated:
 When the Japanese dropped the bomb on Pearl Harbor there was a Negro sailor
 whose total duties involved kitchen-type duties .... He cradled a machine gun in
 his arms, which is not an easy thing to do, and stood at the end of a pier blazing
 away at Japanese airplanes that were coming down and strafing him and that
 [segregation] was all changed.
 Id. When an observant reporter pointed out that Truman had ordered the prohibition of
 the practice of segregation at least three years after the war had culminated, the President
 wistfully responded, "I remember the scene .... It was very powerful." Id.
 This phenomenon is hardly confined either to President Reagan or to those who
 supported him. As one historian notes, "[W]e have had a series of prominent public
 figures, from Harry S Truman to Ronald Reagan, who have misread, distorted, or
 trivialized the national past for self-serving purposes or for the vindication of misguided
 policies, foreign and domestic." Michael Kammen, Selvages and Biases: The Fabric of
 History in American Culture 19 (1987); see also Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The
 Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (1973).
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 American history likewise applies to the history of the American Constitu-
 tion. In his landmark work about the Constitution in American culture,
 A Machine That Would Go of Itself, historian Michael Kammen persuasively
 argues that though "America is always talking about its Constitution,"3 its
 "fulsome rhetoric of reverence [has been] more than offset by the reality
 of ignorance."4
 For better and for worse, a similar theme of allure and apathy char-
 acterizes the work of constitutional "professionals." Lawyers, judges,
 and-the ultimate concern of this Article-legal academics regularly
 turn to history when talking about the Constitution, and not merely as a
 rhetorical trope.5 This point obtains most strongly for originalists, for
 whom the use of history is dispositive in settling constitutional questions.6
 Yet some affinity for history, while not necessarily universal, cuts across
 various axes. It is apparent in works both recent7 and classic.8 It issues
 3. Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of Itself: The Constitution In
 American Culture 3, 217-314 (1986).
 4. Id. at 3. Kammen's study concentrates on the perceptions of "ordinary" Americans,
 whom he identifies as "nonprofessionals" who do not practice law or teach constitutional
 law. Id. at xi. Kammen's work does not make a sharp distinction between ignorance of the
 Constitution and ignorance of constitutional history, but instead views these two subjects as
 intertwined. See id. passim.
 5. With regard to the bar, some of the more recent and lengthy-and more
 rigorous-historical treatments include the following: Brief of 250 American Historians as
 Amici Curiae in Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Planned
 Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902);
 Brief Amicus Curiae of Eric Foner, John H. Franklin, Louis R. Harlan, Stanley N. Katz,
 Leon F. Litwack, C. Vann Woodward, and Mary Frances Berry, Patterson v. McClean Credit
 Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107).
 With regard to the bench, some more recent and lengthy-and self-evidently
 problematic-historical treatments include the following: New York v. United States, 112
 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-23 (1992) (O'Connor, J.); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668-70
 (Souter, J., concurring) (1992); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-75 (1991)
 (Scalia, J.); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-60 (1991) (O'Connor, J.); Dennis v.
 Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 452-58 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
 U.S. 186, 192-95 (1986) (White, J.); id. at 196-97 (Burger, CJ., concurring). For a
 cautionary antidote, see New York v. United States at 2444 n.3 (White, J., concurring in
 part and dissenting in part).
 6. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
 143-60 (1990).
 7. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-government in American
 Constitutional Theory (1993).
 8. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
 at the Bar of Politics (1962).
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 not only from the Right9 but also from the Left.'0 It is even evident
 among theorists whose work is often seen as antithetical to originalism."I
 Despite this propensity, or maybe because of it, constitutional dis-
 course is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problem-
 atic and at worst, howlers. Robert Bork's The Tempting of America is filled
 with authoritative historical conclusions yet cites scarcely any primary or,
 for that matter, secondary sources.'2 Paul Kahn, in a study entitled
 Legitimacy and History, boldly divides American constitutional thought
 into six successive "models of construction," but does so on the basis of
 few primary works for any given period and with scant reference to secon-
 dary literature.13 Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, relying on
 early state separation of powers clauses, confidently state that "a separate
 category of administrative power to be apportioned by the legislature did
 not exist in the Framers' world," without pausing to consider how the very
 constitutions they single out dramatically undercut their claim.14 The il-
 9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
 Domain (1985).
 10. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process
 (1980); David AJ. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism (1989); David AJ.
 Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (1986).
 11. Even Ronald Dworkin, as steadfast a foe of originalism as exists, will occasionally
 make an historical assertion. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 360 (1986) ("In
 fact the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by lawmakers who thought they were not
 outlawing racially segregated education.").
 12. See Bork, supra note 6. For a short and devastating critique on this score, see
 Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 Yale LJ. 1419, 1422-25 (1990)
 (reviewing Bork, supra note 6, arguing that Bork has "cast off the constraints of the judge
 without accepting the disciplines of the scholar").
 13. Kahn, supra note 7, passim. Gordon S. Wood provides a telling methodological
 contrast in The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1992) [hereinafter Wood,
 Radicalism]. There, he divides American political culture between 1750 and 1850 into
 three general periods, but relies on hundreds of primary sources and dozens of secondary
 works to make the point. This is not to say that a theorist like Kahn must engage in the
 same rigorous research undertaken by a leading historian. Kahn's avowed project,
 however, is to derive a morphology of constitutional discourse over time based on a
 descriptive account of the development of American constitutional discourse. To the
 extent that his argument rests on history (or historiography), it would be more convincing
 if his methodology relied more heavily on intellectual history monographs at least.
 For a discussion of basic methodological standards for making convincing historical
 assertions, see infra text accompanying notes 122-143.
 14. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
 the Law, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 607 (1994). More specifically, Calabresi and Prakash quote the
 separation of powers clauses of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 and the Massachusetts
 Constitution of 1780 to conclude that, for the Framers, "[t]he Executive alone was
 empowered to execute all laws." Id.
 With regard to Virginia, Calabresi and Prakash ignore a wealth of historical
 scholarship demonstrating that most of the state constitutions framed in 1776 and 1777
 gave rhetorical support to the formalistic conception of separation of powers that the
 authors assert but in fact established governments that approached legislative supremacy
 largely at the expense of executive authority. As Gordon Wood notes, "[w]hat more than
 anything else makes the use of Montesquieu's maxim [that the legislative, executive, and
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 lustrations could go on.15 The point of most (though not all) of them is
 not that the particular assertion may or may not be tenable. Rather, it is
 that habits of poorly supported generalization-which at times fall below
 even the standards of undergraduate history writing-pervade the work
 of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to talk
 about the Constitution.16
 judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct] in 1776 perplexing is the great
 discrepancy between the affirmations of the need to separate the several governmental
 departments and the actual political practice the state governments followed. It seems, as
 historians have noted, that Americans in 1776 gave only a verbal recognition to the
 concept of separation of powers in their Revolutionary constitutions, since they were
 apparently not concerned with a real division of departmental functions." Gordon S.
 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 153-54 (1969) [hereinafter Wood,
 Creation]; see id. at 127-61; see also Willi P. Adams, The First American Constitutions:
 Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era
 275 (1980) (arguing thatJames Madison could easily refute as irrelevant the charge that
 the Constitution failed to keep the three governmental powers separate and distinct).
 The reliance of Calabresi and Prakash on the Massachusetts Constitution is similarly
 problematic. In fact, Massachusetts's political practice fell short of its near absolute
 separation of powers clause in much the same way that Virginia fell short of its earlier,
 more cryptic version. The document, for example, provided for a "council, for advising
 the governor in the executive part of the government," which would further assume the
 governor's authority, and was chosen by the assembly. Mass. Const. of 1780, ch. II, sec. 3,
 arts. I-VII. More striking, the assembly also appointed what in a modern formalist
 conception would be a fair portion of the executive branch, including: "the secretary,
 treasurer, receiver-general, commissary-general, notaries public and naval officers." Id.
 sec. 4, art. I. That said, the Massachusetts Constitution did reflect an enhancement of
 executive authority, in part as a reaction to the legislative excesses of constitutions like
 Virginia's, though Calabresi and Prakash do not note this point. See Wood, Creation,
 supra, at 446-53. For a treatment that comes far closer to capturing the complexity and
 nature of Founding commitments in this area, see Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances
 in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 138-53 (1994).
 15. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 360 (arguing, on the basis of a single
 statement from the floor manager of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the fact that the same
 Congress continued to segregate District of Columbia schools, that the Framers of the
 Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended abolition of segregated schools);
 Choper, supra note 10, at 244 (arguing, without relying on primary sources other than The
 Federalist, that "the assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact protect,
 individual constitutional freedoms . . . has no solid historical or logical basis").
 16. One reason for the lack of standards among many constitutional theorists is the
 difficulty of interdisciplinary exchange. As William E. Nelson has observed, lawyers and
 historians do not share a professional ethos. Lawyers, including legal academics, place a
 premium on making arguments. By contrast, historians emphasize explanation, context,
 and secondary works, as well as primary sources. See William E. Nelson, History and
 Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1237 (1986).
 From this divergence several practical differences flow. Where historians must sift
 through primary sources, lawyers need concern themselves with only minimal research,
 and then mostly in prepackaged reporters or databases. The classic article on how
 differently lawyers and historians approach the past is Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court,
 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 155-58; cf. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions
 of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349 (1989); Robert W.
 Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L. J. 1017 (1981); Charles Miller, The
 Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969). Conversely, where the historical
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 While historical scholarship itself for a long time exacerbated these
 ahistorical habits, it now provides unprecedented opportunities for in-
 forming our constitutional present with our constitutional past. Such, at
 any rate, is the case with the Foundingl7 and, no less important, the de-
 velopments that led to it.18 Earlier historians too readily looked abroad
 to England and the Continent to make sense of early American experi-
 ence and in the process ignored or denigrated the distinctive constitu-
 tional achievements that this experience produced. Many theorists fol-
 lowed and still follow suit.19 In the past two generations, however,
 profession generally allows far more time for pursuing a project, its legal counterpart
 places a premium on speed and productivity. See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok:
 Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990).
 Legal academics, in short, generally lack the perspective, time, or knowledge of
 sources to pursue historical study well. As John Hart Ely wryly notes, "Now I know lawyers
 are a cocky lot: the fact that our profession brings us into contact with many disciplines
 often generates the delusion that we have mastered them all." John Hart Ely, Democracy
 and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 56 (1980). If the foregoing sampler is any
 indication, Ely's observation applies with special force to the use of history in constitutional
 discourse.
 17. I employ the conventional labels when referring to periods and events relevant to
 early American constitutional history. Thus, the "Revolution" refers to the late eighteenth-
 century American struggle, both rhetorical and armed, against British claims of authority
 over the colonies; "Independence" refers to the successful American assertion of autonomy
 from Great Britain; "Critical Period," refers to the era between Independence and the
 framing of the Constitution; "Founding" refers to the efforts that culminated in the
 drafting and ratification of the Federal Constitution.
 By contrast, I do not follow the usual practice in using "Founders" rather than
 "Framers." Strictly speaking, "Framers" applies only to the fifty-five men who participated
 in the Philadelphia Convention, which drafted the document. In historical terms,
 speaking of the "Framers" leaves out numerous individuals-John Adams and Thomas
 Jefferson to name two-who were critical to early American constitutional thinking. Cf. 1
 The Founders' Constitution at xiii (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
 According to most theoretical accounts, moreover, the views that merit greater weight are
 not those of the Framers, who merely proposed a plan of government, but those who
 ratified that plan in state conventions. See, e.g., Charles Lofgren, The Original
 Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Commentary 77, 79-85 (1988) (arguing that
 the relevant intent for original intent analysis is ratifier intent). Finally, for the purposes of
 this Article, "early American" refers to the period starting with American resistance to
 British Parliamentary rule and concluding with the ratification of the Federal Constitution.
 18. Where the history of the Founding itself "has not flourished in the last half
 century," the Revolution has long been the brooding omnipresence over much early
 American scholarship. Just as the Revolution has overshadowed the Founding, it has
 dominated study of the colonial period. As Joyce Appleby notes, "The generations of
 colonial life merged into a preparatory stage for the sequence of national events that
 began with the Revolution. And since the Revolution itself was treated as a precedent-
 shattering moment in world history, interest was always skewed toward the exceptional."
 Joyce Appleby, A Different Kind of Independence: The Postwar Restructuring of the
 Historical Study of Early America, 50 Wm. & Mary Q. 245, 246 (3rd ser. 1993).
 19. Set forth most recently in his ongoing We the People project, Ackerman declares
 that "[w]hile our civic practice remains rooted in the distinctive patterns of the American
 past, sophisticated constitutional thought has increasingly elaborated the genius of
 American institutions with theories fabricated elsewhere-to the point where these rivals
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 numerous scholars have instead taken seriously the ideas that early Amer-
 ican political thinkers espoused. A few of these have even attempted to
 do justice to the legal and constitutional facets of those ideas. Together,
 their work goes a long way toward the rediscovery of American constitu-
 tionalism as it existed before Independence, which in turn illuminates
 the "Critical Period" under the Articles of Confederation, which further
 elucidates the Founding itself.
 The rediscovery of America's formative constitutional traditions
 promises a wealth of historical insights closer to home for any theorist
 inclined to look at the past. So far, that wealth has been only partially
 tapped. Theorists such as Richard Epstein, committed to at least one ver-
 sion of foundational rights, claim to look at the American past but see
 little more than John Locke. Other thinkers, including Cass Sunstein,
 Susanna Sherry, and other "neo-," "modern," or "civic" republicans,
 themselves committed to democratic discourse, actually acknowledge the
 historical complexity that current scholarship recounts.20 Too many,
 however, effectively disregard those elements of early constitutional
 thought that fail to echo the polis of Athens or the republics of the
 are more familiar than [America's own distinctive] framework." 1 Bruce Ackerman, We
 the People: Foundations 5-6 (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman, We the People].
 These "theories fabricated elsewhere" broadly fall into two camps: one Anglophilic;
 the other, Anglo-German. One, which Ackerman calls "monist democracy," presumes that
 "[d]emocracy requires the grant of plenary lawmaking authority to the winners of the last
 general election," and features thinkers such as Woodrow Wilson, James Bradley Thayer,
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and John Hart Ely. Id. at 7. In overt and subtle ways, these
 and other monist democrats turn for inspiration to "the brooding omnipresence [of] an
 idealized version of British parliamentary practice." Id. The other school, which
 Ackerman terms "rights foundationalism," posits that the American Constitution is "first
 and foremost" about the protection of fundamental rights. This school is represented by
 such diverse theorists as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein, and Owen Fiss. On
 Ackerman's view, foundationalist thinkers draw on philosophers such as "Kant (via Rawls)
 and Locke (via Nozick)." Id. at 11.
 What follows from this deep engagement with political thought developed in other
 nations, Ackerman argues, has been a cursory, almost embarrassed encounter with the
 constitutional past that emerged in the United States. Or, as Ackerman puts it, the
 problem is not
 that modernist commentators disdain the use of selective quotations from the
 Federalist and other canonical sources. They simply do not use these sources to
 elaborate the distinctive political ideal that they contain. Instead, they cast the
 Founders as derivative social engineers, the makers of a better mousetrap from
 plans prepared elsewhere.
 Id. at 36.
 20. Some of the most prominent works of the "civic republican" school include:
 Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986);
 Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
 Va. L. Rev. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan.
 L. Rev. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; see generally, Kathryn Abrams,
 Law's Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1591 (1988); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The
 Career of a Concept, 79J. Am. Hist. 11, 33-34 (1992).
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Wed, 20 Dec 2017 23:36:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1995] HISTORY "LITE" 529
 Renaissance.2' Somewhere in between, Bruce Ackerman offers an inter-
 pretive theory of the Founding that is hardly less intricate or provocative.
 This Article explores the historiography of early American constitu-
 tionalism to suggest the insights that have yet to emerge fully from a seri-
 ous engagement with America's own formative constitutional experience.
 Part II looks to earlier historical work to show that this current redis-
 covery was long in coming because historians themselves had been domi-
 nated by English models on the one hand, and by Continental models on
 the other. Part III explores the recent rediscovery of early American con-
 stitutionalism and the rich possibilities it presents for historically-minded
 theorists. It first recounts how this rediscovery proceeded, with special
 emphasis on material as yet ignored by modern constitutional thinkers,
 and then examines the main themes advanced by the resulting historical
 scholarship. Part IV begins with a discussion of the basic standards that
 should be used to measure the historical assertions made by constitu-
 tional theorists, and then applies these standards to a sampling of the
 efforts by several of the leading theorists working today. It continues by
 suggesting that modern constitutional theory itself has yet to make full
 use of the opportunity that recent historical scholarship presents because
 it retains the earlier historians' habit of looking elsewhere. Specifically,
 "neo-liberals" such as Richard Epstein overplay the early American com-
 mitment to rights, and "neo-republicans" such as Sunstein overemphasize
 the Founding commitment to civic virtue and political participation.
 Only Ackerman, the Part contends, attempts to reconstruct how the
 Founding generation reconciled various strands of constitutional thought
 in a historically credible fashion, though even his work falls short in cer-
 tain respects. The Article concludes that any theory opting for reductive
 simplicity, especially for the sake of either democratic process or individ-
 ual liberty, is likely to forfeit its claim to historical credibility, at least to
 the extent it purports to rest on the nation's nascent constitutional expe-
 rience. If early American constitutional development reveals anything, it
 reveals that neither those who would base their theories preeminently on
 rights and autonomy, nor those who would ground their paradigms ex-
 clusively on self-government and democracy, can lay easy claim to the tra-
 ditions that the Constitution itself embodies-try though they might.
 II. HISTORIES FABRICATED ELSEWHERE
 For much of this century (and the last), few historians took early
 American constitutional thought seriously. In part for this reason, theo-
 rists like Edward Corwin often had to invent the historical wheel them-
 selves.22 This historiographical blind spot, in turn, stemmed in no small
 21. See Rodgers, supra note 20.
 22. A notable example in this respect is Corwin's rigorous historical critique-much
 of which is based on his own research-of ChiefJustice Taft's assertions in Myers v. United
 States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See Edward S. Corwin, The President's Removal Power Under
 the Constitution (1927).
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 degree from the tendency of earlier historians to look outside the United
 States-in particular, either to England or the Continent-for models to
 explain how the nation became independent and established a successful
 central government. Understanding this tendency helps to explain why
 theorists had relatively little historical material to consult for so long.
 More importantly, such an understanding helps account for the parallel
 habit of constitutional theorists of looking abroad for their own models-
 a habit that is only now breaking down as it did for historians forty years
 ago.
 A. Rule (Onward) Britannia
 Colonial Whigs undertook the resistance that would lead to revolu-
 tion. But it was a later set of Whigs, indebted to their scholarly counter-
 parts in England, that would first record that process exhaustively. No-
 where did the views of this "Whig School" find more authoritative or
 eloquent expression than in the works of George Bancroft. With a dog-
 gedness that is the envy of any successor, Bancroft combined an encyclo-
 pedic command of available sources with a muscular narrative style to
 produce his epic ten-volume History of the United States, originally appear-
 ing between 1834 and 1874.23 Although this work may have set new stan-
 dards of rigor, its conclusions have not endured.
 Yet one stance taken by the Whig historians persists, and that is
 Bancroft's practice of overlooking the constitutional arguments made in
 the years surrounding the Revolution itself. This habit followed because
 the Whig conception of the struggle, unlike that of the original Whigs
 who participated in it, had little place for constitutional explanations.
 For Bancroft, a Yankee nationalist, Jacksonian Democrat, Navy Secretary
 under Polk, and minister to Britain and Prussia, the Revolution was a
 chapter in a much larger, all but predestined story. In that story, English
 settlers in the New World found themselves blessed to inhabit a land with
 enough empty space and with sufficient distance from Old World deca-
 dence to give full vent to the natural human yearning for liberty. On this
 account, revolutionary resistance took shape as a conflict between an
 American population dedicated to freedom on one side, and, on the
 other, a rigid monarch and venal Parliament bent on controlling the col-
 onies, even at the price of imposing tyranny. In the Whig rendition,
 therefore, American complaints were not seen as specific constitutional
 grievances so much as a general outcry against a "war on human
 freedom. "24
 Far from rehabilitating constitutional thought, the initial challenge
 to the Whigs only made matters worse. By the turn of the twentieth cen-
 23. Bancroft condensed the work into six volumes in his final revisions. See George
 Bancroft, History of the United States of America, From the Discovery of the Continent
 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1886).
 24. 3 id. at 482.
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 tury, Bancroft's romantic patriotism had produced scholarly reactions
 which, along with attendant claims of dispassionate, professional, and
 "scientific" methods of historical craft, set in motion the yin and yang of
 revisionism and counterrevisionism that have been the hallmark of the
 field ever since. Itself influenced by a Wilsonian-style Anglophilia promi-
 nent in American universities and in U.S. foreign policy prior to the First
 World War, the foremost response to the Whig view not surprisingly
 adopted an English perspective. Out of the ranks of this Imperial School
 came some of the foremost colonialists from the first half of this century,
 including Herbert Levi Osgood, George Louis Beer, Charles McLean
 Andrews, Leonard Larabee, and finally, Lawrence Henry Gipson.
 Despite important differences, common themes pervaded the works
 of these men. Each rejected the simple tale of British tyranny oppressing
 America, instead emphasizing that imperial policies that led to the con-
 flict were a reasonable response to the colonies' refusal to contribute an
 adequate share to the upkeep of the Empire. From this viewpoint, inde-
 pendence arose not because the British government was bent on impos-
 ing tyrannical control, but because geography inevitably led Americans to
 have different interests than their English counterparts an ocean away.
 Once France and Spain had been removed from North America as
 threats in 1763, little remained to prevent the colonists from going their
 own way. For each side, the point was not constitutional principle, but
 pragmatic self-interest.25
 Ironically, Imperial historians could dismiss the importance of Amer-
 ican constitutional arguments, not because they ignored them, but pre-
 cisely because others in their ranks considered those arguments and mis-
 takenly found them to be wanting. Matters seemed to begin promisingly
 enough with the pioneering efforts of Charles McIlwain. In his 1923 vol-
 ume, The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation, McIlwain ar-
 gued that Parliament had not legislated outside the realm of England
 until well after the colonies had been settled, that subsequent imperial
 legislation constituted an innovation without required colonial consent,
 and that therefore the colonists had legitimate constitutional complaints
 about Parliamentary interference.26 Shortly after McIlwain's thesis ap-
 peared, however, Robert Livingston Schuyler attempted not only to re-
 fute, but to demolish it. Citing one act of Parliament after another,
 25. See Herbert L. Osgood, The American Revolution, 13 Pol. Sci. Q. 41 (1898);
 George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (1922); Charles M. Andrews, The
 Colonial Background of the American Revolution: Four Essays in American Colonial
 History 62-66 (1964); Leonard W. Larabee, Royal Government in America (1930);
 Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution (15 vols.
 1958-70). Gipson, whose multi-volume opus is the most comprehensive of all the works
 cited, distilled the basic argument of the Imperial School. See Lawrence H. Gipson, The
 American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, 1754-1763, 65 Pol.
 Sci. Q. 86 (1950).
 26. See Charles H. McIlwain, The American Revolution: A Constitutional
 Interpretation 186-98, passim (1966).
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 Schuyler's Parliament and the British Empire established that Parliament in
 fact had legislated for the dominions outside England since at least the
 fourteenth century.27 In short order, the same scholarly community that
 had cheered McIlwain's Pulitzer Prize winning conclusions turned away
 from his thesis in embarrassment.28 That said, not all historians felt com-
 pelled to take sides. Andrew C. McLaughlin, for one, sagely implied that
 the very disagreement between "[s]cholars of unquestioned skill and
 learning" over rival American and British claims indicated that neither
 side could claim "indubitable legal correctness. "29 In the main, however,
 the Imperial School had apparently confirmed that whether sincere or
 disingenuous, colonial arguments that the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, or
 the Townshend duties amounted to constitutional violations were simply
 wrong, and that the causes for the Revolution lay outside the arena of
 legitimate constitutional quarrel.
 B. The Continental Divide
 With the Progressives, the fate of constitutional scholarship hit bot-
 tom. It also became the victim of approaches derived not from English
 Whigs, but from German Marxists and "scientific" historians.30 For the
 Progressives, American constitutional claims were more than erroneous
 or even irrelevant. They were deceitful. This conclusion logically fol-
 lowed from Progressive premises. Whereas the Imperial historians re-
 jected the Whig view by looking outward and emphasizing policy and ad-
 ministration, the Progressives responded by looking inward with a view
 towards economics and social division. In this emphasis, Progressive his-
 torians reflected their contemporary political namesakes.31
 Following up pioneering studies by Charles Kendall Adams, Charles
 H. Lincoln, Carl Becker, and not least himself,32 Arthur M. Schlesinger,
 27. See Robert L. Schuyler, Parliament and the British Empire: Some Constitutional
 Controversies Concerning Imperial Legislative Jurisdiction 1-39 (1963).
 28. For an initially favorable response to Mc~lwain, see G.B. Adams, Book Review, 33
 Yale L.J. 567, 568 (1924). For a representative assessment of McIlwain in light of Schuyler's
 work, see Julius Goebel, Jr., Book Review, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1930). For an
 overall account of the "Schuyler/McIlwain" debate, see Barbara A. Black, The Constitution
 of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1157, 1158-62 (1976); Martin S.
 Flaherty, Note, The Empire Strikes Back: Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph of Imperial
 Parliamentary Supremacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev., 593, 594-96 (1987); Liam S. O'Melinn,
 Note, The American Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Seventeenth-Century West
 Indies, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 104, 105-14 (1995).
 29. Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 82 (1935).
 30. See Kammen, supra note 3, at 114-15.
 31. For a general account, see Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians:
 Turner, Beard, Parrington (1968).
 32. See Carl L. Becker, The History of the Political Parties in the Province of New
 York, 1760-1776 (1909); Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in
 Pennsylvania, 1760-1776 (1968); Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the
 American Revolution, 1763-1776 (1957); Charles K Adams, Some Neglected Aspects of
 the Revolutionary War, 82 The Atlantic Monthly, 174-89 (1898).
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 Sr. rendered the blueprint on which the Progressives would build in an
 article entitled "The American Revolution Reconsidered."33 Schlesinger
 contended that the colonies themselves were divided into commercial
 and slaveowning aristocracies along the seaboard, and democratic ele-
 ments in the cities and the interior; the aristocratic classes, he asserted,
 opposed Parliamentary interference on economic grounds, but this very
 opposition gave yeomen and mechanics the opportunity and rhetoric to
 press for more radical democratic reforms at the expense of both the
 imperial and domestic ruling classes. Not long after, J. Franklin Jameson
 provided a comprehensive version of this picture in The American Revolu-
 tion Considered As A Social Movement.34 Charles Beard's already pervasive
 view that the Federal Convention codified a Thermidorian victory of the
 propertied classes over revolutionary radicalism seemingly confirmed the
 notion that the Progressive approach could account for the entire era.35
 Accordingly, serious concern for the actual constitutional arguments
 that Americans had employed all but vanished. Schlesinger himself
 sounded the theme in claiming that far from being a great forensic con-
 troversy over abstract governmental rights, aristocratic resistance to Brit-
 ish policy was "contemptuous, if not fearful, of disputes upon question [s]
 of abstract right[s]."36 Subsequent studies by Becker and Randolph G.
 Adams would go further in suggesting that American constitutional argu-
 ments shifted to suit American economic needs.37 No other plausible
 explanation seemed to account for claims that Parliament had no author-
 ity to levy an "internal" tax like the Stamp Act, only later to oppose the
 Townshend duties by denying Parliament any authority to tax at all, only
 at last to oppose the Boston Port Act with the argument that Parliament
 lacked even the authority to legislate. Further stops on the road to skepti-
 cism came in the years leading to World War II with John C. Miller's Sam
 Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda and Philip Davidson's Propaganda and the
 American Revolution.38 As the titles implied, these works treated patriot
 rhetoric as a device to manipulate public opinion in the service of deeper
 economic motives. This assessment accorded with the times, as the Great
 Depression spawned totalitarian regimes that seemed to have perfected
 propaganda as just this type of device. From the viewpoint of historical
 plausibility, the thesis more importantly dovetailed with the Progressive
 33. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, The American Revolution Reconsidered, 34 Pol. Sci.
 Q. 61 (1919).
 34. See J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social
 Movement (1973).
 35. See Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
 United States (1986).
 36. Schlesinger, supra note 33, at 66-71.
 37. See Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of
 Political Ideas (1958); Randolph G. Adams, The Political Ideas of the American Revolution
 (1958).
 38. See Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783
 (1941); John C. Miller, Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda (1960).
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 tale of domestic aristocrats resisting Britain for economic reasons, only to
 see the fight co-opted by democratic radicals who had economic scores of
 their own to settle. Prophets shunned in their own land at least have the
 comfort of being ahead of their time. The triumph of the Progressive
 conception robbed the patriots' ghosts of even this solace.
 The fortunes of American constitutionalism in many ways returned
 to square one with the ascent of a new kind of social history in the after-
 math of the Second World War. Here inspiration, in part, also came
 from Germany, in the form of Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
 Capitalism,39 and, in part, from England through the work of such
 Cambridge scholars as Peter Laslett and Quentin Skinner.40 Mostly,
 though, influential approaches issued from the French Annales School, in
 large part consolidated by Fernand Braudel.41 In Europe, these strategies
 turned to social history as nothing less than a means for "compre-
 hend [ing] past society in its totality,"42 especially the relationship of envi-
 ronment to economic development, family life, and everyday existence.
 In America, these developments prompted historians to view early
 America as a society, or societies, to be explained for its own sake rather
 than as a prelude to independence. As Joyce Appleby recently observed,
 "early American historians of the last generation have attached them-
 selves to a European frame of reference that, perversely, has had a liberat-
 ing effect on their scholarship."43
 What resulted is the return of American constitutional thought to
 the margins, amidst an exploration of social history far richer than any-
 thing the Progressives could have imagined. Local studies by scholars like
 Philip Greven and Kenneth Lockridge still stand as early landmarks re-
 flecting new concerns for comprehensive social study.44 Such historians
 as Gary Nash, Winthrop Jordan, Peter Wood, and Francis Jennings, a
 number of whom also employed new and imaginative techniques, like-
 wise attempted to recapture the experiences of African-Americans and
 39. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Talcott Parsons
 trans., 1958).
 40. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 Hist.
 & Theory 3 (1969). See generally, Appleby, supra note 18, at 248-49, 261 (discussing the
 influence of scholars such as Weber and Skinner in examining history through social
 structures).
 41. The name derives from the journal, Annales: Economies, Sociites, Civilizations, which
 highlighted the group's work. For an account of the Annales school, see Traian
 Stoianovich, French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm (1976).
 42. Appleby, supra note 18, at 248.
 43. Id. at 245.
 44. See Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in
 Colonial Andover, Massachusetts (1970); Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town, the
 First Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (1970); see generally John M.
 Murrin, Review Essay, 11 Hist. & Theory 226 (1972) (reviewing Greven and Lockridge,
 among others).
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 Native Americans.45 More recently still, Carol Karlsen, Nancy Cott, and
 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich have done the same for women.46 This new
 mainstream may indeed be "liberating" for early American history in gen-
 eral. But it is not hard to see how a mainstream that places a premium on
 social history in the first instance, and minimizes the importance of the
 Revolution in the second, at best returns the constitutional commitments
 of American patriots to a state of salutary neglect. A number of histori-
 ans, moreover, worked to insure that this situation did not remain "at
 best." New Left scholars like Jesse Lemisch and Gary Nash merged older
 Progressive stances with Annales School approaches to argue that the driv-
 ing force behind the commitment to self-government came not only from
 the ideas of the elite but from the concerns of sailors, artisans, the urban
 poor, and the otherwise "inarticulate" as well.47
 III. REDISCOVERING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
 Whatever else prompts many constitutional theorists to fumble the
 history of the Founding, the lack of historical scholarship is no longer
 one of them. At least such is the case with regard to the origins of Ameri-
 can constitutionalism.48 For the past two generations, historians have
 produced studies of imagination and rigor that have rediscovered first
 the ideological and then the legal world in which early American consti-
 tutionalism emerged. The result is an immense body of work that pro-
 vides theorists an unprecedented opportunity to recapture for themselves
 the experience and ideas present at the creation of our constitutional
 45. See Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the
 Cant of Conquest (1975); Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes
 Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (1977); Gary B. Nash, Red, White, and Black: The Peoples
 of Early America (1974); Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South
 Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion (1974).
 46. See Carol F. Karlsen, The Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial
 New England (1987); Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in
 New England, 1780-1835 (1977); Laurel T. Ulrich, A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha
 Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812 (1990).
 47. See Jesse Lemisch, The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up, in
 Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History 3 (Barton J. Bernstein ed.,
 1968); Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of
 Revolutionary America, 25 Wm. & Mary Q. 371 (3rd ser. 1968); Gary B. Nash, Social
 Change and the Growth of Prerevolutionary Urban Radicalism, in The American
 Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism 3 (Alfred F. Young ed.,
 1976).
 48. Though beyond the scope of this Article, another candidate in this regard is work
 on the Civil War and Reconstruction. A select but by no means exhaustive list of important
 studies includes: Chester J. Antieau, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
 Amendment (1981); Michael K Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
 Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's
 Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (1988); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
 Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863
 (1986); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to
 Judicial Doctrine (1988).
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 order. Coming to grips with this opportunity first requires some idea of
 how it came about, especially the critical yet undervalued role played by
 scholarship on the Revolution. Appreciating this opportunity likewise re-
 quires considering at least the main works and themes this scholarly ren-
 aissance has produced.
 A. The Constitutional Origins of American Independence
 Before American constitutional thought could be taken seriously,
 American thought in general had to be taken seriously. And before that
 could happen, American thought in general simply had to be taken into
 account. One of the first works to attempt this claimed to do it all. In The
 Liberal Tradition in America, Louis Hartz reduced the American society-
 and with it both the Revolution and the Constitution-to a tale of unique
 liberal consensus grounded in the political philosophy of John Locke.49
 Perfectly pitched for Eisenhower's America, Hartz's message was that
 "Locke dominates American political thought as no thinker dominates
 the political thought of a nation."50 For Hartz, Lockean thought meant a
 system that enshrined individual rights, laid the groundwork for capital-
 ism, and left a legacy of moderate political discourse. On this view, the
 Revolution became a happy anomaly and the Constitution a blueprint for
 a stable liberal democracy. The Revolution and Constitution also became
 symbols of a general American exceptionalism against the backdrop of a
 Europe historically plagued by royalism and radicalism. That American
 liberalism rested on the shoulders of an English philosopher was less a
 contradiction than a paradox, since it was America's nonfeudal past that
 permitted it to embrace Locke more fully than any other nation. In that
 embrace, Locke became American.
 Hartz's liberal account, however, proved to be too grand an explana-
 tion based upon too little investigation. In short order the vision of
 America as an applied version of the Two Treatises of Government5l fell vic-
 tim to exacting scholarly criticism by specialists in early American history.
 Too seldom noted in this regard is The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolu-
 tion, by Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan.52 This work would have sig-
 naled a new tack had it done nothing more than provide a detailed survey
 of the principal American claims against Parliament as expressed in
 speeches, pamphlets, resolutions, and newspaper articles.53 But Stamp Act
 49. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
 American Political Thought since the Revolution (1955).
 50. Id. at 140.
 51. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988)
 (3d ed. 1698).
 52. See Edmund S. Morgan & Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to
 Revolution (1953).
 53. Edmund Morgan underscored the importance of reclaiming the colonists'
 position by editing a selection of the principal sources. See Prologue to Revolution:
 Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766 (Edmund S. Morgan ed.,
 1959).
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 Crisis did more. The Morgans examined the full range of colonial objec-
 tions-economic, legal, and constitutional. As part of this endeavor they
 also challenged the Imperial School's view that the Grenville ministry,
 which imposed the Stamp Act on the colonies, had given the colonies a
 genuine opportunity to vote financial contributions to the Empire, and
 its corollary-that the American failure to do so represented mere
 tightfistedness.54
 Most importantly, Stamp Act Crisis closely scrutinized the American
 constitutional case that Parliament lacked the authority to tax the colo-
 nies. In accomplishing this, the Morgans refuted the notion that
 Americans had objected merely to "internal" taxes, only to reverse their
 position the moment the Townshend duties imposed "external" taxes.
 Rather, they contended that the colonists adopted a principled position
 that would remain consistent throughout the Anglo-American contro-
 versy. Nor, in contrast to Hartz, did the Morgansjettison Progressive con-
 cerns. Stamp Act Crisis took pains to demonstrate the complex interplay
 between the leaders of American resistance and the crowds that pre-
 vented the Stamp Act from being enforced, an interplay producing a
 shared concern with Parliament's constitutional encroachments. In this
 way, their volume at once declined to write the less well-to-do out of the
 story entirely and anticipated New Left calls to examine the motivations
 of just these groups. Taken together, the lessons of the Stamp Act con-
 troversy promised a radically new approach to the Anglo-American crisis
 in general. The "Prologue to Revolution" thus promised also to serve as a
 prologue to scholarship.
 Making good on that promise in the first instance fell to Bernard
 Bailyn. Bailyn happened into this task by serving as the editor of
 Pamphlets of the American Revolution,55 a projected multi-volume collection
 that has yet to go past the first volume, but that required Bailyn to im-
 merse himself in the massive polemical literature that the American op-
 position produced. Nor was he alone, for what here appears as happen-
 stance was in fact part of a larger trend. Apart from the Morgans, other
 scholars were also turning to the pamphlets of the day with fresh eyes. In
 particular, Caroline Robbins had already immersed herself in the im-
 mense polemical literature produced by a marginal yet persistent English
 opposition to the eighteenth-century Parliament. Rather than a collec-
 tion, her efforts yielded the important monograph The Eighteenth-Century
 Commonwealthman.56 The significance of the work lay not in any thesis
 Robbins advanced; it lay instead in the sheer vastness of her subject, one
 she set out in encyclopedic fashion. Her further implication, that the
 fervent writings of men like Robert Molesworth, John Trenchard,
 54. For an example of the Imperial School, see, e.g., Andrews, supra note 25, at
 133-41.
 55. See 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1765 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
 1965).
 56. See Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (1959).
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 Thomas Gordon, and Lord Bolingbroke somehow mattered, was not lost
 on Bailyn.
 Bailyn transformed his own expertise into more pointed interpreta-
 tion. The result was the seminal Ideological Origins of the American Revolu-
 tion.57 This famous volume is not three paragraphs old before it commits
 the ritual sacrifice of its forebears, declaring that "the American Revolu-
 tion was above all else an ideological, constitutional, political struggle and
 not primarily a controversy between social groups."58 Principles mat-
 tered, and it was Parliament's violation of those principles which the
 Americans held dear that prompted their eventual rebellion. The
 precepts that mattered most derived from nearly all the sources Ameri-
 cans could get their hands on, running the full range of "Enlightenment
 abstractions and common law precedents, covenant theology, and classi-
 cal analogy-Locke and Abraham, Brutus and Coke."59 The harmoniz-
 ing force for these voices, the "framework" within which they could all be
 "brought together into a comprehensive theory," was the very same Com-
 monwealth thought salvaged by Robbins.60 Viewed through this me-
 dium, the regulations that Parliament sought to impose after 1763 took
 on a sinister spin. In the logic of the Commonwealth ideology, proposals
 for an American episcopate, perceived constitutional violations such as
 the Stamp Act, royal opposition to colonial proposals giving American
 judges life tenure, the suppression of John Wilkes, and the landing of
 British troops in Boston, all pointed inexorably to a conspiracy against
 English liberty mounted by a venal ministry. It was to prevent enslave-
 ment to this corrupt junto that more than any other reason led the
 Americans to take up arms.
 In all of this, constitutional arguments at last play a role, but only a
 subsidiary and ambiguous one. For Bailyn it matters that the colonists
 believed certain Parliamentary measures exceeded limits on its authority
 and violated guarantees of colonial rights based upon constraints higher
 than any Act of Parliament itself. Yet these beliefs mattered in the same
 way that worry about an American episcopate mattered. They counted
 not so much because they could have prompted resistance, but because
 they served as evidence of a "deliberate assault of power upon liberty."'61
 Why Bailyn treats constitutional principles this way is not hard to guess.
 Ideological Origins never deals with the issue of how sound American con-
 stitutional arguments were. It does, to be sure, describe measures such as
 the Stamp Act as "unconstitutional taxing." Approving references to cer-
 tain historians who did express views on the matter, however, suggest that
 Bailyn did not find much reason to challenge the conclusion of the Impe-
 57. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967).
 58. Id. at vi.
 59. Id. at 54.
 60. Id.
 61. Id. at 117.
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 rial School that the colonists were simply wrong on the law.62 The pref-
 ace to the "silver anniversary" edition of Ideological Origins makes this sug-
 gestion more strongly. In this update, Bailyn states that the
 revolutionaries concluded that the preservation of their freedom re-
 quired "the destruction of the political and constitutional system that had
 hitherto governed them."63 This statement does not easily square with
 the view that the colonists made a plausible constitutional case. Instead it
 implies that the colonists put forth claims that were legally dubious, that
 they lost on the merits, and that they had no choice but to free them-
 selves of the settled constitutional framework. Yet implication does not
 amount to a considered argument, despite the conclusions that scholars
 commonly attribute to Bailyn's work. Ideological Origins can be read for
 the proposition that what the colonists perceived to be constitutional vio-
 lations were no more than that-their own perceptions. However, noth-
 ing in the book forecloses the finding that the American and British con-
 ceptions of the constitution, each of them tenable, simply diverged.
 The same goes for Gordon S. Wood's magisterial Creation of the Ameri-
 can Republic.64 In part this is because Creation is chiefly a study of the
 Critical Period and Founding rather than the Revolution. In the main it
 picks up just where Ideological Origins leaves off, examining how American
 ideology after 1776 shaped the Federal Constitution. From here Creation
 makes its central point: The newly independent American citizenry ex-
 perimented with radically republican state constitutions, only to reject
 the conventional understandings on which they were based and to invent
 "a new science of politics" that culminated in the Federal Constitution.65
 This claim, to say nothing of Wood's encyclopedic research, has greatly
 influenced how historians have approached the period ever since. This is
 not to say that many of the book's assertions have gone unchallenged.66
 Nor has the book garnered a monopoly. In particular, Forrest
 McDonald, whose earlier work did much to clear the way for ideologically
 minded historians, offers a significantly less tidy account of ideological
 development in his important Novus Ordo Seclorum.67 No one, however,
 62. Id. at 94-143.
 63. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution vii (enlarged
 ed. 1992) (1967).
 64. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14.
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31, and infra text accompanying notes
 102-114.
 66. For a critique of Creation from a number of perspectives, see generally Forum:
 The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews,
 44 Wm. & Mary Q. 549 (3rd ser. 1987).
 67. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the
 Constitution (1985).
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 has seriously challenged the essentials of Creation's central claim;68 nor
 has anyone removed Creation from its preeminent place in the field.69
 Despite its focus, or perhaps because of it, Wood's project demon-
 strated the debt that study of the Constitution's origins owed to the redis-
 covery of Revolutionary thought. For one immediate yet symbolic thing,
 Wood's work began as a follow-up study to the work of Bailyn, who served
 as Wood's dissertation advisor. More importantly, Wood's work-and for
 that matter, McDonald's-proceeds on the premise that the ideas under-
 lying the Constitution cannot be understood without also understanding
 the constitutional ideas that came before. Creation therefore commences
 with a background treatment of the political thought that led to the
 Revolution.70 There Wood generally follows his mentor; while noting
 that the colonists perceived constitutional violations, he generally fails to
 assess the worth of those claims.71 To do this would have required Wood,
 or Bailyn, not only to resurrect the colonists' ideology, but to reconstruct
 contemporary constitutional law as well. This task by its nature requires
 not only considerable research, but legal training as well. Thus, it would
 fall to others.
 Just as it was doing so, one further landmark work of ideological his-
 tory appeared. This was The Machiavellian Moment by J.G.A. Pocock.72
 Pocock's work stands alongside the studies of Bailyn and Wood insofar as
 it, too, takes the ideas of the revolutionaries and their constitution-mak-
 ing successors seriously. But unlike that of Bailyn and Wood, Pocock's
 orientation had less to do with rejecting the Progressives or challenging
 Hartz than with seeking to examine the language of politics as "a social
 construction of reality that determines how men and women interpret
 events, assign value, and decide to act."73 In this Pocock looked to Eu-
 rope, specifically to those Cambridge scholars who were attempting to
 uncover deep societal structures generally.74
 This commitment led Pocock to make central a particular body of
 thought that Bailyn and Wood had portrayed as simply important. For
 Pocock, American revolutionary thought in particular, and early Ameri-
 68. McDonald, who is quick to point out his disagreements with Wood, see id. at 67
 n.25, nonetheless agrees that the Constitutional Convention in large part arose as a
 response to perceived excesses of the state governments and that it produced a document
 reflecting a fundamental departure in political thought. See id. at 143-83.
 69. See Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicentennial, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1565,
 1594-97 (1987) (hailing Wood's Creation as "the most influential single work of historical
 scholarship on the Founding Period to appear in the past two decades").
 70. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 3-45. So, too, does McDonald. See
 McDonald, supra note 67, at 1-142.
 71. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 10-45. Wood does, however, suggest that
 American views of the English constitution were idiosyncratic. See id. at 13-15.
 72. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and
 the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975).
 73. Appleby, supra note 18, at 263.
 74. See id. at 247-48, 261.
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 can ideas in general, were "country"-or as the term was later recast, "re-
 publican." By this Pocock meant that early Americans spoke a conceptual
 language in which individuals gained meaning as citizens committed to
 the common enterprise of self-government. Much of The Machiavellian
 Moment traces the pedigree of this intellectual heritage through the
 English political thought that flourished during the Commonwealth pe-
 riod of the seventeenth century to Niccolo Machiavelli's rediscovery of
 the classical Greek polis in Renaissance Italy. In England, this republican
 or "country" ideology did constant battle with the "court" ideology usually
 advocated by those who controlled the central apparatus of government.
 But in America nearly all was "country" thought.75 Thus, when various
 "court" measures like the Sugar and Stamp Acts issued forth, American
 colonists inevitably assessed and opposed them on the basis of their re-
 publican understandings.76
 As Daniel Rodgers has explained, the republican model put forth
 by Pocock, in particular-met many scholarly needs and gained swift as-
 cendancy.77 But it also created its own problems. Since most historians
 ultimately conceded that America eventually became the land of liber-
 alism that Hartz said it was, Pocock's republicanism spawned an increas-
 ingly "acrid" debate as to when and on what level of society the transfor-
 mation from republicanism to liberalism occurred.78 Despite this
 challenge, or perhaps because of it, Pocock's republicanism became the
 historical model of choice for legal academics arguing their own points
 with reference to early America.79
 With respect to the arguments that patriots actually made, however,
 the republican model left out a good deal. Much of what was left out was
 clear from the start, such as religion and culture generally.80 Much was
 only becoming clear, namely the law. Central in this latter category was
 the work of historians who were often located down the same hall from
 75. See Pocock, supra note 72, at 525 (stating that "[t] here was no American Court").
 76. See id. at 506-52.
 77. See Rodgers, supra note 20, at 11-38.
 78. See Rodgers, supra note 20, at 33. See generallyJoyce Appleby, Liberalism and
 Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (1992); Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism
 and Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. & Mary Q. 334 (3rd ser. 1982) (discussing the
 clash of current scholarly views regarding the place of republicanism in early America);
 Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
 Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 Wm. & Mary Q. 49 (3rd
 ser. 1972) (discussing the evolution of a dominant view of the role of republicanism in
 early American history).
 79. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 20, at 17-55; Sherry, supra note 20, at 550-62,
 574-79; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 20, at 30 n.7; see generally Abrams, supra
 note 20 (criticizing the use that legal scholars have made of historical research on
 republicanism); Rodgers, supra note 20, at 33-34.
 80. In Rodgers's phrase, the republican model "squeezed out massive domains of
 culture." Rodgers, supra note 20, at 17. One stunning omission was religion, the point of
 Edmund S. Morgan's famous essay, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24
 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (3rd ser. 1967).
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 the constitutional theorists who embraced republicanism. Among those
 still too often neglected in this regard areJulius Goebel, Thomas C. Grey,
 Barbara Black, and John Phillip Reid. The legal backgrounds of these
 historians set them apart from those historians associated with the Impe-
 rial School who (except for the Morgans) had last examined constitu-
 tional questions. Many of those earlier scholars, including Charles H.
 McIlwain, Robert Livingston Schuyler, and Andrew C. McLaughlin, were
 professors of government or history.8' The legal historians would also set
 themselves apart from their predecessors in another way. Whereas the
 earlier group generally saw American constitutional claims as dubious,
 the more the later group learned, the more it disagreed. Their conclu-
 sions, however, usually appeared in the backwaters of legal publications.
 It would take time before they would find their way into the historical
 mainstream.82
 Reexamining American constitutional claims first meant rehabilitat-
 ing them. Doing this, in turn, required culling the "touch of rightness" in
 McIlwain's original thesis. This phrase comes from Barbara Black's im-
 portant article, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colo-
 nists."83 Black's essay refuted the seemingly irrefutable notion that
 Schuyler's citation of medieval precedents in which Parliament bound
 dependencies outside the realm belied McIlwain's assertion that Parlia-
 ment never legislated for the dependencies before the colonies were set-
 tled. Black countered with the critical point that Parliament in the Mid-
 dle Ages made laws as the King's Council rather than as a representative
 body.84 This conciliar model had only begun to change to a representa-
 tive one by the time the colonial settlement took place. Schuyler conse-
 quently attributed the acts of Parliament, the royal council, to its nominal
 but not functional successor, Parliament, the legislature. "Constitution of
 Empire" did much to repeal Schuyler as the last word, and to revivify
 McIlwain's main contention. When the colonists first left England, the
 only imperial authority over them that was beyond question lay with the
 King and his Council. American patriots were not necessarily "wrong on
 the law" after all.85
 But this did not mean that they were right, either. Parliament, per-
 haps, could not have established imperial authority as a legislature when
 English settlers began their conquest of the New World. On the eve of
 the Revolution, however, the English constitutional world had changed.
 The twin turning points of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Han-
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29 (discussing views of McIlwain, Schulyer,
 and McLaughlin).
 82. For a thoughtful survey, see jack P. Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context
 and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. Atlantic Q. 56 (1986).
 83. See Black, supra note 28.
 84. See id. at 1171.
 85. See id. at 1170-72.
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 overian Succession of 171486 signalled that Parliament, at least domesti-
 cally, had made the shift from a subordinate advisory body to a dominant
 legislative one.87 For the dependencies, this shift could have produced
 one of two general corollaries: either Parliament would fill the vacuum
 left by the retreating monarchy and simply replace the crown as the sover-
 eign overseas policymaker, or it would follow the constitutional principles
 on which it claimed its own power against the monarchy and defer to
 local representative assemblies outside the realm. Parliament not surpris-
 ingly opted to fill the vacuum by laying claim to the crown's imperial
 authority. By the time of the American Revolution, respectable Parlia-
 mentary advocates could argue that Britain's legislature was not subject
 even to constitutional limits that had previously bound the monarch
 either in or beyond the realm.
 It still does not follow that American Whigs were wrong in arguing
 the contrary position. Parliament's assertion of its authority alone did
 not establish its legitimacy. Then as now, the United Kingdom lacked any
 mechanism for the authoritative resolution of constitutional conflicts.
 The answer to which side was "right on the law" can thus never be known
 in the sense of looking up a considered decision handed down by an
 ostensibly impartial tribunal. Despite the lack of a "Supreme Court," or
 perhaps because of it, a vast body of constitutional discourse existed
 against which American and British claims could be considered. The
 question for the new breed of constitutional scholars was not therefore
 which side was "correct." Rather, the query was whether American patri-
 ots asserted sound claims as measured by the accepted constitutional
 principles of the day.
 The answer to this question has been a resounding yes, and no histo-
 rian has been more resolute in articulating it than John Phillip Reid. For
 over three decades Reid has kept the legal and academic presses hum-
 ming with articles, reviews, and monographs too numerous to mention.88
 86. In 1714, the Elector of Hanover, a German prince, acceded to the British throne
 upon the death of Queen Anne, to become King George I. George's accession marked the
 end of the Stuart dynasty. See generally H.T. Dickinson, Walpole and the Whig Supremacy
 45-49, 70-71, 113-14, 121-26 (1973).
 87. For a discussion of the shift and its consequences, see Flaherty, supra note 28.
 88. A Reid sampler includes the following: The Apparatus of Constitutional Advocacy
 and the American Revolution: A Review of Five Books, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 187 (1967); In a
 Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in Law, and the Coming of the
 American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1043 (1974); In Accordance With Usage: The
 Authority of Custom, The Stamp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution,
 45 Fordham L. Rev. 335 (1976); In Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of "Arbitrary," the
 Supremacy of Parliament, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 5 Hofstra L. Rev.
 459 (1977); In Defiance of the Law: The Standing-Army Controversy, the Two
 Constitutions, and the Coming of the American Revolution (1981); In a Defiant Stance:
 The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the
 American Revolution (1977); The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American
 Revolution (1988); The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution
 (1989).
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 If there is anything in the field to rival Reid's prolific output it is his own
 encyclopedic command of constitutional sources, whether case law, offi-
 cial pronouncements, or pamphlets. Reid puts both his persistence and
 learning on display in his multi-volume Constitutional History of the Ameri-
 can Revolution,89 which also represents the culmination of the long effort
 to resurrect American constitutional arguments.
 To begin with, Reid shows that the colonial case was far more than
 just tenable. American Whigs, he argues, espoused what might be termed
 a "Commonwealth" version of the English Constitution that was
 grounded in traditional concepts already commonplace by the seven-
 teenth century. Under this constitution any sovereign power-including
 Parliament-labored under numerous limits designed to safeguard a
 well-known and well-defined set of English rights. The constraints in-
 cluded: the consent of the governed; various fundamental contracts, first
 between the ruler and the ruled, and then between the ruler and those
 sent out to colonize new lands; custom, in the sense of practices that over
 time had acquired their own authority; and various binding precedents
 and analogies. The set of rights included property, jury trials, personal
 security, and freedom from arbitrary government90
 Reid's development of these themes challenges the understandings
 of previous generations of historians. In particular, he argues that
 neither Locke nor "natural law" framed American constitutional dis-
 course. As a corollary, he contends that, at least in England, a different
 version of the Constitution must have developed to do combat with the
 Commonwealth-or seventeenth-century-version.9' Otherwise, there
 would not have been the constitutional battle that took place. Especially
 within the ministry, the constitutional vision that emerged supplanted the
 concept of constraints with a newer "Absolutist Constitution" that called
 for Parliament's supremacy and ultimately, its sovereignty. In this way
 Reid at least implicitly turns the traditional view upside down. If any-
 thing, Constitutional History hints, the older version of the English Consti-
 tution is the better one.
 Legal historians also push their conclusions to a different logical ex-
 treme, and once more no one does it more forcefully than Reid. Each
 volume of Constitutional History begins with the disclaimer that the project
 speaks only to constitutional aspects of the Revolution, and not to its so-
 cial, economic, or political causes. This is, however, a caveat honored
 only in the breach. Throughout his work Reid writes as if the constitu-
 tional aspects explain all. Frequently he says as much. "What America
 89. See generally John P. Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution
 (1986-93). The project consists of four volumes: 1 The Authority of Rights (1986); 2 The
 Authority to Tax (1987); 3 The Authority to Legislate (1991); 4 The Authority of Law
 (1993).
 90. See 1 id. passim.
 91. On this point, and certain questions it raises, see Eben Moglen, Book Review, 9
 Law & Hist. Rev. 389, 391-92 (1991).
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 was constitutionally compelled to defend," he at one point opines, "the
 British could not constitutionally concede. The difference might be a
 mere abstraction of law, but once stated, civil war was inescapable."92 In
 this way Reid and his fellow legalists turn the traditional view upside down
 once more. Where earlier historians saw a revolution accounting for con-
 stitutional rhetoric, legal historians see constitutional rhetoric accounting
 for a revolution.
 Whether anyone else will is another question. Not long ago, the
 growing body of work by legal historians began to filter its way into the
 awareness of historians generally. Much credit for this translation must
 go to Jack P. Greene, who was among the first "mainstream" historians to
 appreciate the work of the Legal School.93 Recently he went a step fur-
 ther and, with Peripheries and Center, presented an extended sketch of the
 main themes constitutional scholars have been emphasizing.94 For rea-
 sons unclear, however, Greene's work appears to have served as a summa-
 tion rather than as an invitation to further work. At any rate, so it seems
 with regard to those historians who first suggested that Americans may
 have meant what they said. For his part, Bailyn long ago left the field of
 ideas to concentrate instead on social movements in the literal sense.95
 Wood has followed suit.96 Even Greene hasjoined what appears to be the
 ongoing Annales preoccupation with social history.97 This development is
 ironic in many ways, not least because constitutional history requires
 much more to be done.
 B. Constitutional Reconstruction
 What has been done nonetheless allows for certain conclusions.
 First, the current reconstruction of early American constitutionalism per-
 mits a more complete picture of the Revolution. But the import of this
 project does not stop at 1776, because the more complete picture that
 the Legal School permits in turn illuminates the received account of
 American thought leading to the Constitution. That is, a received ac-
 count that centers around the work of Gordon Wood, which is itself the
 product of the past generation's turn toward the study of ideas, and a
 92. 2 Reid, supra note 89, at 282.
 93. See Greene, supra note 82, at 56-77.
 94. See Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the
 Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (1986).
 95. See generally Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America (1986);
 Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of
 the Revolution (1986).
 96. See generally Wood, Radicalism, supra note 13. While this work powerfully
 complements Wood's earlier Creation of the American Republic, it does so by focusing on
 themes of culture and economics rather than constitutional principles.
 97. See generally Jack P. Greene, Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in
 Early American Cultural History (1992);Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social
 Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture
 (1988).
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 version of which has already worked its way into the thought of numerous
 constitutional theorists. This enhanced understanding in turn should ul-
 timately yield a richer historical backdrop against which to critique the
 work of these theorists.
 Americans, it now seems clear, marched towards independence
 armed with a coherent and tenable constitutional brief. This brief con-
 sisted of a set of principles, derived from the English Constitution of the
 previous century, which emphasized constraints on government authority
 in order to protect traditional English rights, and which tied governmen-
 tal legitimacy to representation.98 Seen from one perspective, the evi-
 dent commitment to rights might be termed "liberal." In this regard, the
 constitution the Americans advanced was fully consistent with Locke, and
 at times augmented with Lockean references, though as Reid has tire-
 lessly argued, it owed little to the philosopher directly. Seen from an-
 other perspective, though, the patriot constitution appears "republican"
 in its devotion to representation and self-rule.
 But in truth either label has its problems, a point understood by
 those historians-many of whom are often labeled "republican"-who
 first delved into these matters seriously. As Bailyn pointed out in Ideologi-
 cal Origins, Americans drew from a multitude of traditions that may look
 contradictory today, but did not at the time.99 Wood himself has never
 fully abandoned the point, stating just recently that the question whether
 republicanism or liberalism dominated in late eighteenth-century
 America is not only "badly put [but also] . . . assumes a sharp dichotomy
 between two clearly identifiable traditions that eighteenth-century reality
 will not support .... Jefferson, for example, could believe simultaneously
 and without any sense of inconsistency in the likelihood of America's be-
 coming corrupt and in the need to protect individual rights from govern-
 ment."'00 What mattered to the patriots was not the conflict of two dis-
 tinct conceptions of government, still less the dominance of any one.
 What mattered, rather, was Westminster's violation of a plausible consti-
 tutional framework under which these and other conceptions had a
 place. 101
 Independence changed this. For one thing, it rode in tandem with
 an armed struggle that placed a premium on public spirit, virtue, and
 sacrifice of individual interests for the greater good.102 For another, it
 deprived Americans of exactly the constitution on which they had relied
 in making their case against Westminster. Gone was the monarch; gone
 was the aristocracy; and so, gone was any hope of replicating the "mixed
 98. See infra text accompanying notes 100-107.
 99. See generally Bailyn, supra note 63.
 100. Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 Wm. & Mary
 Q. 628, 634 (3rd ser. 1987).
 101. See 4 Reid, supra note 89, at 3-8.
 102. See generally Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental
 Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (1979).
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 government" of which Britons were so proud. The only familiar materials
 remaining lay in the legislature, and from these the logical structures to
 build were republics as classically understood. Thus even Daniel
 Rodgers, who is mostly bemused by republicanism's academic faddish-
 ness, is open to the possibility that the "cognitive roadmap" it can provide
 may be "effective in describing a revolutionary moment," whatever its dif-
 ficulties in accounting for the "quarrels and compromises of normal
 politics."1103
 The constitutional commitments Americans brought to indepen-
 dence underscore many scholarly themes about how those commitments
 developed subsequently. The most influential theme, pioneered by
 Wood, holds that while "republican principles" may not have "domi-
 nated" in a sharply defined contest with liberalism, they did account for
 much that occurred in the first flush of state constitution-making after
 May 10, 1776.104 In rhetoric, republican precepts became manifest in the
 idealization of the states as "Christian Sparta," in growing anxiety about
 American virtue, and in marshalling religion and education to insure that
 such virtue as did exist endured.'05 In structure, these led to an emphasis
 on representation. Nowhere was this tendency better highlighted than in
 the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution, which featured a one-house legisla-
 ture, annual elections, a multiple executive, and the posting of bills for
 public debate.'06 In each provision republican precepts led to a
 marginalization of the notion that a constitution meant external con-
 straints on what government could do. That concept may have made
 sense when reining in a monarch or unrepresentative Parliament. It
 seemed less central in dealing with a state legislature ostensibly responsi-
 ble to a virtuous citizenry.'07
 From this critical point, scholarship on the constitutional thought
 that preceded the Constitution also supplies a richer backdrop for con-
 sidering the framing of the Constitution itself. Starkly put, the constitu-
 tional case that led to independence presumed that representative gov-
 ernment and individual liberty complemented one another.
 Independence revealed-and practically speaking, revealed for the first
 time-that representative government could endanger rights rather than
 protect them. This backdrop supports the central thesis in Wood's ac-
 count that too many constitutional theorists somehow miss: that the Fed-
 eralists who conceived the Constitution reacted to the excesses seen in
 republican state governments by transforming the very concept of consti-
 103. Rodgers, supra note 20, at 35.
 104. On that date the Continental Congress recommended to the several colonies to
 draft new constitutions. See Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-89, at
 58-59 (1987).
 105. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 421-29.
 106. See Pa. Const. of 1776, ?? 2, 9, 15, 19, 23; see also Wood, Creation, supra note
 14, at 132-42.
 107. See Wood, Creation supra note 14, at 162-88; Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the
 People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 239-62 (1988).
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 tutionalism.108 This transformation rested in large part on the unhappy
 insight that even the American citizenry could not be counted upon to
 muster sufficient virtue to prevent the republican model from encroach-
 ing on liberty.109 Its success in turn rested on the Federalists' ability to
 offer a less republican framework by relocating sovereignty away from all
 government, placing it instead in "We the People," whose approval dur-
 ing extraordinary times would give this new framework a more funda-
 mental stamp of legitimacy.110 For some, the first part of this story con-
 firms the Beardian notion that the Constitution heralded a Thermidorian
 triumph which cleared the ground for a pluralistic land of self-interested,
 liberal go-getters."11 For others, it confirms the persistence of the repub-
 lican model for daily governance.112
 Both assessments miss large points. The first overlooks the way in
 which the great Federalist innovation of relocating sovereignty in "We the
 People" arguably preserved a role for a republican politics of virtue in the
 creation of constitutional norms. The second ignores Wood's main point
 that the perceived failure of republicanism is what prompted the soon-to-
 be Federalists to congregate at Annapolis in the first place. Either assess-
 ment, in short, misses the complexity of the Federalist achievement and
 the possibility that it represented a synthesis of different traditions.
 It is in this way that the scholarship concentrating upon the Revolu-
 tion reenters the picture. For it seems not just plausible but likely that
 Federalists drew both on the recent American understandings in creating
 republican governments on the state level, and on their older concep-
 tions of constitutionalism predating Independence. This point appears
 108. Wood writes:
 The Federalists' achievement was not in creating a totally new set of ideas, for this
 they could never have done. Rather their achievement lay in their ability to bring
 together into a comprehensive whole diffuse and often rudimentary lines of
 thought, to make intelligible and consistent the tangles and confusions of
 previous American ideas.
 Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 564; see also id. at 519-615 (discussing the Federalists'
 positions, as well as their campaign in favor of the Constitution); Morgan, supra note 107,
 at 263-87 (discussing republicanism and the U.S. Constitution).
 109. In The Federalist No. 10 Madison famously noted:
 Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous
 citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public and personal
 liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is
 disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often
 decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party,
 but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
 The Federalist No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
 110. See The Federalist No. 49, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
 Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 306-43; Morgan, supra note 107, at 267-77. For a
 discussion of the modern theoretical implications of this point, see infra text
 accompanying notes 188-191.
 111. Richard Epstein in part adopts just this kind of account. See infra text
 accompanying notes 162-187.
 112. See supra note 20.
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 doubly plausible insofar as this older brand of constitutionalism itself
 combined various conceptions whose tensions would not become mani-
 fest until after 1776. On the institutional level, the patriot constitution
 uniting local legislatures into a larger polity offered a precedent for fed-
 eralism."13 More fundamentally, the patriot conception offered a strong
 vision of a constitution serving as a constraint designed to protect tradi-
 tional rights against the power of government, a conception at times
 eclipsed in the flush of early state constitution-making, yet a vision that
 nonetheless valued self-government as an end in itself. In this respect,
 recent work on the many steps leading to 1787 contributes to a growing
 literature that, taken together, views the Founding as a union of ideologi-
 cal trends rather than the triumph of any one.'14
 IV. HISTORIES "Lim"- To WEIGHTY
 A. History and Theory
 The rediscovery of early American constitutionalism, so long in com-
 ing, promised great things for modern American constitutionalism. After
 decades of looking predominantly elsewhere, historians began at last to
 take early American ideas seriously, and more recently even to treat early
 American constitutional ideas respectfully. These efforts have for the first
 time allowed a reconstruction of the constitutional thought underlying
 the Revolution, which has in turn permitted a better understanding of
 the Founding. Modern theorists inclined to rely on early American his-
 tory'15 therefore found themselves presented with an unparalleled op-
 portunity, and there was every reason to believe that they would seize it.
 As Kathryn Abrams notes generally, "[1] egal scholars are natural scaveng-
 ers," and here was much to scavenge."16 Daniel Rodgers has observed
 more specifically that historians offered these rediscoveries of early Amer-
 ican thought at a time when many theorists found these reconstructions
 especially useful to their projects."17 In part this need arose because the
 113. See Greene, supra note 94, at 91, 103, 172-74, 198-207.
 114. For a list which is by no means comprehensive, see, e.g., Beyond Confederation:
 Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity (Richard R. Beeman et al. eds.,
 1987); McDonald, supra note 67; Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An
 Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (1979); Richard R. Beeman, Deference,
 Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America, 49
 Wm. & Mary Q. 401 (3rd ser. 1992); Forum, supra note 66; James T. Kloppenberg, The
 Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political
 Discourse, 74J. Am. Hist. 9 (1987); Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The
 Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (3rd ser. 1988); see also Bernstein, supra
 note 69, at 1578-97 (discussing the complexity of recent work on the Founding).
 115. The extent of this promise, of course, turns on the extent to which modem
 theorists find it necessary to invoke history. The promise is therefore immense for thinkers
 such as Ackerman, who find history dispositive in the derivation of constitutional
 principles, but minuscule for writers like Dworkin, who invoke history almost not at all.
 116. Abrams, supra note 20, at 1591.
 117. See Rodgers, supra note 20, at 30-31.
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 view of law as a self-sufficient discipline had begun to break down. In
 larger part it arose from the challenge issued by politically conservative
 originalists to derive constitutional principles from the intentions of the
 Founders."18
 In theory this turn to history is a good thing. Developing a norma-
 tive case to defend why this is so, however, is a task better pursued else-
 where. For the purposes of the critique that follows, what matters is that
 the individuals who introduce history into legal discourse to enhance
 their claims are the theorists themselves. That said, some notion of why
 history ought to be consulted in constitutional theory should be sketched,
 lest any criticisms of how this has actually been done appear as an argu-
 ment against doing it at all.
 American constitutional theorists are correct to turn to the history of
 the Founding for a number of reasons. Most generally, situating ideas in
 the context in which they arose enables us to comprehend and assess
 those ideas better than we would by viewing them as free-floating princi-
 ples. This follows because the original historical setting almost invariably
 suggests reasons to accept or reject a given idea that would not otherwise
 be apparent. Understanding separation of powers as originally a consid-
 ered response to majoritarian tyranny, for example, aids us in consider-
 ing the doctrine's ongoing relevance, depending upon how serious we
 believe the threat that gave rise to it continues to be."19 Beyond this,
 contemporary theorists do well to reconstruct the ideas of the American
 Founders in particular because these thinkers were not only individuals
 of great ability-which may not set them apart from other thinkers-but
 also because many of them spent two decades applying their principles
 first to a resistance movement and then to the task of framing new gov-
 ernments.'20 Having to face both tasks makes the Founders close to
 unique. Finally, and most specifically, American theorists do well to turn
 to our early constitutional history precisely because it is ours. As Ronald
 Dworkin contends, a given theory should broadly comport with our con-
 stitutional document and culture.'2' None of these reasons compels the
 originalist view that the ideas of the Founders should be dispositive. They
 do, however, confirm the almost universal historicist practice of turning
 to those views for guidance.
 118. This phenomenon has been especially apparent with regard to the Ninth
 Amendment. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment,
 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 131, 134-39 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment:
 Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1001, 1001 (1988). As Sherry
 aptly notes, the "reactive foray into the origins of the ninth amendment-and to an even
 greater extent, into the eighteenth century idea of unenumerated rights generally-has
 rewarded historically-minded non-originalists beyond their wildest dreams." Id. at 1001.
 119. For an excellent discussion developing these themes, see Don Herzog, Happy
 Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 27-33 (1989).
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 49-113.
 121. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 140 (1985).
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 Notwithstanding both the practical and normative incentives for ap-
 pealing to the Founding, the promise of recent historical scholarship has
 not been entirely fulfilled. A sampling of work by some of the most
 prominent and productive constitutional theorists writing today reveals a
 startling range of historical sophistication-running from the problem-
 atic, to the plausible, to the provocative.
 Assessing how well a given theorist has relied on history presupposes
 that there are standards for making this assessment. Those standards
 most plausibly come from the discipline of history itself. This conclusion
 follows not so much because historians determine what is historically
 true,'22 but because they commonly resolve what is historically convinc-
 ing. Constitutional interpretation is itself, after all, preeminently "a dis-
 course of argument and persuasion."''23 Among the academics and pro-
 fessionals who make up the audience which constitutional theorists seek
 to persuade, it is axiomatic that any argument drawing from another es-
 tablished discipline is convincing to the extent that it abides by the con-
 ventions of that discipline. As William Nelson argues, "At a theoretical
 level, the assumption that scholarly standards can emerge out of a con-
 sensus of individual scholars with quite different ideological and aesthetic
 preferences retains respectability today."''24 Likewise remaining respecta-
 ble is a belief in specialization. University departments, professional as-
 sociations, topical journals, and electronic mail "listservs" all testify to the
 ongoing assumption that the overall community needs smaller groups of
 experts to develop more specialized standards for the exploration of nar-
 rower fields.'25 A final widespread assumption involves deference to
 these groups of specialists. Perhaps even more dramatically than other
 fields, the law has formalized this principle in relaxing the general evi-
 dentiary prohibition against opinion testimony for experts.'26
 Consider a typical example involving legal theory and economics.
 An academic lawyer seeks to advocate nonrestrictive corporate takeover
 laws. To do so, she contends that, as a matter of economics, such a re-
 gime benefits shareholders with higher stock prices yet does not harm
 employees through the migration ofjobs. She could base this contention
 on personal anecdote, a citation to the Second Circuit, or the say-so of
 her astrologer. Or she could rely on empirical studies-either her own,
 or more realistically, those undertaken by economists-which abide by
 122. Whether a matter can be deemed historically "true" in an objective sense need
 not be resolved to assert the utility of historical standards. For a discussion on historical
 objectivity, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the
 American Historical Profession (1988); see also Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity Is Not
 Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick's That Noble Dream, 29 Hist. & Theory 129,
 130 (1990) (disagreeing with Novick's assessment that objectivity as an ideal is essentially
 confused).
 123. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 695 (1987).
 124. William E. Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 478 (1982).
 125. See id. at 477.
 126. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702 (providing for opinion testimony by expert witnesses).
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 established conventions of economic study.'27 It is hard to imagine any
 legal theorist, regardless of her own scholarly practices, who would not
 consider the last of these options as the most convincing.'28 Similar ex-
 amples, moreover, could be drawn from the law's encounter with any
 number of other disciplines.'29
 History is no different, or at least not sufficiently different that its
 conventions may be blithely ignored. A catalogue of such standards
 might well partake of the prolixity of a graduate school bulletin.'30 For
 present purposes, this catalogue need include only the most basic stan-
 dards, if only because lawyers and legal scholars frequently make basic
 mistakes. It may be edited down still further to mention just those basic
 standards that appear to cause the legal community the most problems.
 Of these, one set has to do with convincing historical methods. The
 other has to do with convincing historical conclusions. Dressed up in
 legal jargon, some historical standards sound in procedure, and others in
 substance.
 All sorts of "procedure" signify a persuasive historical assertion in the
 making. Perhaps the most basic is simply getting elementary facts
 straight.'3' Former Chief Justice Burger, for example, states in his origi-
 127. This example is drawn from Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate
 Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 856-60 (1993).
 128. There is, in fact, a cottage industry of scholars who subject law and economics
 works to economic critiques. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive
 Economic Theory of Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1447, 1454 (1987) (reviewing William M.
 Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987), paying
 particular attention to positivist theory); see also CharlesJ. Goetz, Law and Economics:
 Cases and Materials, 463-66 (1984) (emphasizing the professional utility of economic
 literacy in the study of law); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of
 Law, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 4 (1975) (pointing out the inherent biases and inconsistencies in
 the Posner school of law and economic methodology); Duncan Kennedy & Frank I.
 Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 712 (1980)
 justifying private property and enforceable contract through economic analysis); MarioJ.
 Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 642 (1980) (information
 requirements in pursuit of the normative case for legal efficiency are so high as to render
 such pursuit impractical).
 129. Martha Nussbaum, for example, casts a cold eye on current lawyerly invocations
 of philosophy, stating:
 The professional standards of philosophy for philosophy are very different from
 the standards applied to the philosophical articles one finds in such [law]
 journals. Most of what I have read on emotion and empathy in the law, for
 example, would not even get a very high grade as an undergraduate paper written
 for a course of mine at Brown.
 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 Stan. L.
 Rev. 1627, 1644 (1993).
 130. For an attempt to set forth just some of these standards, see Powell, supra note
 123, at 662-91.
 131. I call getting a basic fact right a matter of "procedure" or method rather than
 "substance" because the accuracy of such a fact does not reflect on the substance of a
 larger assertion so much as indicate the methodological rigor underlying the assertion.
 For example, getting right the exact date of the Puritan massacre of the Pequots near
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 nal introduction to the "official" bicentennial edition of the U.S.
 Constitution that "[t] he work of 55 men at Philadelphia in 1787 marked
 the beginning of the end of the concept of the divine right of kings."''32
 Now, many things can be said about what is wrong with this statement,
 not the least of which is that "the concept of divine right of kings" ceased
 to be a part of mainstream Anglophone political thought-and failed to
 command a significant fringe-on either side of the Atlantic not long
 after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and arguably earlier.'33 Moreover,
 so distant was the Revolution-much less the Founding-from the divine
 right of kings that, as noted, American patriots entered the fighting with
 a constitutional understanding that denied the authority of Parliament
 precisely because it posited a connection to the Empire through the au-
 thority of a monarch considered on all sides to be limited by law.'34
 Coming from a former Chief Justice of the United States in an official
 publication issued to rekindle interest in the Constitution and its origins,
 the statement is unfortunate.'135
 More importantly, the legal community notoriously ignores the prin-
 ciple that the individual historical questions that its members commonly
 seek to answer cannot be understood except as "part[ ] of a larger histori-
 cal . . . whole."'36 Two methodological requirements follow. One is the
 necessity of thorough reading, or at least citation, of both primary and
 secondary source material generally recognized by historians as central to
 a given question. Too often, legal scholars make a fetish of one or two
 famous primary sources, and consider their historical case made.'37 An-
 present-day Mystic, Connecticut, does not materially affect the thesis that English Settlers
 from New England were bent on exterminating indigenous peoples. Getting it right,
 however, would instill in the reader a certain confidence that the person making the
 assertion about extermination knew what he or she was talking about. SeeJennings, supra
 note 45, at 219-25.
 132. Warren E. Burger, Foreword to The Constitution, the Law, and Freedom of
 Expression, 1787-1987 (James B. Steward ed., 1987).
 133. See Morgan, supra note 107, at 71-98.
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
 135. For these and other errors in the former Chief Justice's introduction, see
 Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1566-67; see generally Morgan, supra note 107, at 17-39
 (discussing the fate of the doctrine of "divine right of kings" in Anglo-American political
 thought).
 William Nelson points out that this type of basic factual error is rare among legal
 historians. See Nelson, supra note 124, at 482-85. Whether that is true of lawyers and
 legal theorists, however, is another matter.
 136. Powell, supra note 123, at 674.
 137. This is a consistent problem, for example, in Paul Kahn's Legitimacy and History.
 In particular, Kahn follows the lead of many a theorist before him to make sweeping points
 about the Founding period based almost solely on The Federalist. More problematically, he
 does so with virtually no direct citation to a secondary historical article or monograph. See
 Kahn, supra note 7, at 9-31.
 With regard to The Federalist generally, Richard Bernstein has aptly written, "To use
 The Federalist as a means to understand the Constitution and its underlying philosophy is a
 risk-laden pursuit, especially if undertaken for the purpose not of historical understanding
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 other procedural corollary requires viewing, or at least attempting to
 view, events, ideas, and controversies in- a larger context. Here legal
 scholars, in what in its worst form is dubbed "law office history," notori-
 ously pick and choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that serve
 their purposes.'38 In a phrase, persuasive historical procedure dictates
 genuine concern for facts, sources, and context. Abiding by just these
 standards is hard and time-consuming work, often too hard and time-
 consuming to meet the imperatives of legal scholarship.'39
 Substantive concerns that signify convincing historical assertions
 turn on the substantive area under consideration. If historical scholar-
 ship in a given area has settled on a certain account, or more likely, on a
 framework for debate, historical assertions that acknowledge that account
 or framework will simply be more persuasive. That, at least, is the case for
 a history scholar; it is no less the case for a legal scholar arguing history.
 Here the framework, if not the account, arises from exactly those schol-
 arly achievements that resulted when American historians began to take
 American ideology seriously. Its chief expositors, among others, include
 Morgan, Bailyn, Wood, McDonald, Pocock, and Reid. Its main features
 but of prescription for modern constitutional law and politics." Bernstein, supra note 69,
 at 1588. For monographs that engage in this pursuit, see Vincent Ostrom, The Political
 Theory of a Compound Republic (rev. ed. 1987); Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist,
 and the Constitution 3-9, 193-207 (1987).
 138. Robert Bork's Tempting of America is especially rich in just this type of
 noncontextual historical assertion. One in particular arises in his argument that the
 ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand the privileges and immunities
 clause to provide judicial protection for a range of fundamental liberties. This would have
 been unthinkable, he contends, because "[t] he only significant exercise of judicial review
 in the past century had been Dred Scott," which gave the notion of judicial review for the
 protection of rights a bad name. Bork, supra note 6, at 181-82. But making an inference
 from the undisputed fact that Dred Scott occurred is to slight several larger points that, in
 context, make this ostensibly important fact at best irrelevant and at worst cut the other
 way. The assertion overlooks that, by 1867, the North had won the Civil War and, in
 controlling Congress and the judiciary, commanded the mechanisms for enforcing
 national conceptions of fundamental rights dramatically different from a property right
 over human beings. It ignores the expansive role lower Federal courts played in
 Reconstruction. And it omits any even-glancing awareness that these and other matters
 uncongenial to his conclusions have been central to the past generation of scholarship.
 For sources addressing the larger context, see supra note 48.
 139. Professor Powell ably articulates this challenge with reference to originalists
 seeking to invoke the Founding:
 We can understand the original meaning of the Constitution, in whole or in part,
 only by "plunging [ourselves] into the systems of communication in which [the
 Constitution] acquired meaning." If the originalist interpreter is unwilling or
 unable to undertake this difficult and time-consuming task, either personally or
 at least through intense familiarity with the original sources and scholarly
 literature, he ought to drop the claim that he is conforming his constitutional
 thought to that of the founders. The "law office history" of systematic
 anachronism and quotation out of context is unconvincing advocacy and
 unacceptable scholarship.
 Powell, supra note 123, at 675 (citations omitted).
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 emphasize the patriot constitutional case keyed to rights and representa-
 tion, reaction and retrenchment.'40 This is not to say that this account or
 framework will always be the only story. The Whigs, the Progressives, and
 the Imperial historians, after all, had their day too. William Nelson
 rightly argues that one sign of outstanding historical scholarship is work
 that shifts a given substantive paradigm. 141 But, if the past is any guide,
 that type of scholarship is not likely to come from constitutional theorists
 with other lives to lead.
 While the standards just sketched-procedural and substantive
 provide a basis for a historical critique, they do not necessarily do any-
 thing more. In particular, they offer little if any guidance in assessing a
 given theorist's ultimate normative claims. A particular constitutional
 theory may hold, for example, that the events of the Founding are rele-
 vant in resolving constitutional questions, but that factors such as subse-
 quent practice are dispositive. Under the terms of that type of theory,
 even a miserable account of the Founding would only marginally affect
 the normative answers put forward. That said, historical standards still
 matter for the simple reason that, as noted, nearly every constitutional
 theorist believes history adds something to her account. To the extent
 that the history such theorists put forward falls short, whatever they had
 hoped to add to their theoretical accounts evaporates. To the extent that
 they want to recapture it, they must at least modify and, more likely, clar-
 ify their original historical assertions.
 Weighed against these standards, the use of recent historiography in
 legal theory has yielded mixed results. For a sense of that mix one need
 turn no further than certain historical claims advanced by three of to-
 day's most prominent constitutional thinkers: Richard Epstein, Cass Sun-
 stein, and Bruce Ackerman.'42 As will become clear, assessing historical
 claims can take up as many pages as the claims themselves. Considering
 how well any of these prolific scholars appeals to the past in his work
 taken as a whole cannot be done in anything short of an extended study.
 All that can be attempted here, therefore, is a critique of selected histori-
 cal assertions. Such a project is legitimate so long as the selection is rep-
 resentative, or at least not misleading. Toward this end, the accounts to
 be considered come only from each theorist's major works and deal with
 the Founding in ways in which recent historical scholarship is directly
 relevant.
 Viewed together, the selected historical assertions which these schol-
 ars make replicate the pattern set by historians in the days before scholars
 began taking early American discourse on its own terms. On one hand,
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 52-97.
 141. See Nelson, supra note 124, at 485-89.
 142. As has been suggested, one could find any number of other constitutional
 theorists with a habit of turning to history as well. See supra text accompanying notes
 2-14. As will be seen, considering any more than just a few would require a monograph
 rather than an article.
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 Epstein, a champion of "neo-liberal" thinkers, invokes the eighteenth
 century mainly with an eye to England, the better to argue for stringent
 protection of individual contract and property rights. On the other
 hand, Sunstein, a pioneer of "neo-republican" thought, invokes the
 eighteenth century chiefly with a view toward what are ultimately Conti-
 nental models, the better to promote a communitarian polity checked
 less by claims of rights than by appeals to civic virtue and public-regarding
 reason.'43 In between, Bruce Ackerman invokes the eighteenth century
 to consider how the Founding generation itself sought to reconcile re-
 ceived traditions in potentially novel ways, the better to advocate a frame-
 work that-at least in "normal" times-is neither primarily rights-based
 nor entirely democratic.
 B. The Strange Career of Liberal Constitutionalism
 Some of the most influential works invoking the past fall into the
 category of "neo-liberal."''44 Of these, perhaps the most important issue
 from Richard Epstein, one of the academy's foremost defenders of prop-
 erty rights.'45 The sheer volume of Epstein's work-as with that of Sun-
 stein and Ackerman-precludes a critique of his entire opus in a few
 pages.'46 The impracticality of considering everything should not, how-
 143. Interestingly, the "English/Continental" dichotomy inverts depending on
 whether it is applied to constitutional theory or constitutional history. Thus, democratic
 cmonists" commonly invoke English parliamentary models when making theoretical
 arguments, but stress the works of polemicists who themselves looked to Italian and Greek
 republics when making historical arguments. Conversely, "rights foundationalists"
 commonly look to the Continent (Germany in particular) when they argue theory, but
 invoke writers who themselves looked to English thinkers (Locke in particular) when they
 assert history. This inversion occurs largely because the same thing happens with
 historiography.
 144. By this term I refer to "liberal" in its classical economic sense, that is, a
 commitment to property rights against governmental attempts at physical takings,
 economic regulation, or redistribution of wealth. I do not mean "liberal" in the
 philosophical sense as articulated by, for example, John Rawls. See generally John Rawls,
 Political Liberalism (1993).
 145. For an account of modern case law on takings which builds on Epstein's
 approach, see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is
 Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 (1988). Epstein himself notes, critically
 but with "odd comfort," Laurence Tribe's and Michael Dorf's "use of Lockean notions of
 private property," similar to those put forward by Epstein, "in structuring the proper
 interpretation of the Takings Clause." Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at
 Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 699, 702 n.15 (1992) (citing Laurence H.
 Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, 70-71 (1991)).
 146. This opus includes the following: On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common
 Property, 11 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, 17 (Summer 1994); The Federalist Papers: From Practical
 Politics to High Principle, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 13 (1993); Exit Rights Under
 Federalism, 55 J.L. & Contemp. Probs. 147 (Winter 1992); A Common Lawyer Looks at
 Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 145; The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory
 and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1992); International News
 Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law As Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L.
 Rev. 85 (1992); The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 713
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 ever, prevent the consideration of anything. In this light, two managea-
 ble candidates for present purposes are Epstein's important monograph,
 Takings,'47 and his no less significant article, "Toward A Revitalization of
 the Contract Clause."1148 Each study meets the criteria, previously noted,
 for examination. Each is a major work in the author's body of scholar-
 ship. Each, moreover, makes historical claims about the Founding-and
 for that matter about the eighteenth century generally-that invite con-
 sultation of relevant historical studies. Whether a consideration of Ep
 stein's historical assertions in other works would yield different results
 would depend on an examination of those works.
 Unfortunately, an examination of the pertinent assertions in these
 works shows history at something less than its weightiest. Procedurally,
 Epstein's statements about the Founding and its context are conclusory.
 Substantively, they would lead a casual observer to believe that nothing
 much had changed in the study of early America since Louis Hartz. Now,
 none of this may matter much for Epstein's ultimate theoretical conclu-
 sions, if those conclusions in the end do not rest on his views of the
 Founding or of history generally. But even if they do not, this hardly
 means that the problems with Epstein's appeals to the past themselves do
 not matter. To the contrary, they count precisely to the extent that
 Epstein himself-rightly-invokes the authority of history to enhance, re-
 inforce, and embellish his prescriptions. Any failure to make the relevant
 historical assertions in a credible fashion diminishes his overall project in
 just the proportion he hoped to strengthen it.
 As it happens, Epstein's relationship with history, at least in the
 works under scrutiny, is at best ambivalent. As an initial matter, he
 evinces a certain skepticism about history in his explicit refusal to con-
 sider how the Founding generation might have specifically understood or
 applied the constitutional provisions at issue. In Takings, Epstein de-
 clares that his analysis "does not take into account the actual historical
 intention of any of the parties who drafted or signed the document."''49
 Likewise, in "Revitalization" he rejects any close examination of "the so-
 cial and political context of the [Contract] clause ... [or] ... the histori-
 (1989); The Classical Legal Tradition, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 292 (1988); Modem
 Republicanism-Or The Flight From Substance, 97 Yale LJ. 1633 (1988); Luck, 6 Soc.
 Phil. & Pol'y 17 (1988); The Mistakes of 1937, 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 5 (Winter 1988);
 The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987); Self-Interest and
 the Constitution, 37J. Legal Educ. 153 (1987); Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. Phil. &
 Pol'y 49 (Autumn 1986); Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979).
 147. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on
 Eminent Domain, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 253 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South
 Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369 (1993);
 Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 3 (1986);
 148. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
 Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Revitalization].
 149. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 26.
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 cal accounts of the debates at the drafting and ratifying conventions."150
 Epstein dodges these concerns mostly on theoretical grounds, positing
 that not only the best, but indeed the only reliable evidence of original
 understanding is the "plain meaning" of the Constitution's text in light of
 the common linguistic usages of the day and of the document as a
 whole.151 As a matter of interpretive theory, this stance is his preroga-
 tive.152 Whether to look into history at all is properly a matter of theory
 and is not a matter that history itself can determine.153 Only once a his-
 torical assertion is made to support an interpretive claim do basic histori-
 cal standards matter.
 Those standards still matter here, however, because Epstein also re-
 lies on history to avoid history. The "historical particulars" surrounding
 the Takings Clause, he asserts, are "likely to generate more confusion
 than [they] eliminate[ ] ."154 Looking into the specific history of the
 Contract Clause, he states more confidently, can "only distract us."1'55
 Epstein, in other words, contends that the relevant historical sources may
 (Takings) or do (Contracts) add more raw "data,"156 but fail to increase
 understanding. That may well be the case, but Epstein gives few historical
 reasons to believe it. His Takings discussion simply assumes historical
 confusion; his treatment of Contracts seeks to prove "irreducible uncer-
 tainty" on the basis of a monograph and an article-each written before
 1945-plus a student law review note.157 Not surprisingly, the substantive
 150. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 706.
 151. His main objection is the theoretical difficulty of discerning collective intent, a
 point made explicit in his discussion of takings, but merely hinted at with regard to
 contracts. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 27-28 ("Where the number of parties is
 large and the divergence of views great, the best evidence of textual intention is the
 language of the text itself."); Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 707 ("More reliable
 is to treat the Constitution as a whole as the best evidence of that intention, and to try to
 make sense of what the framers did, not of their motives for doing it.").
 152. Epstein's theoretical disavowal of history on a relatively specific level, at least in
 service of original intent, has curious parallels with the interpretative method advocated by
 Ronald Dworkin. Both theorists reject as inherently problematic any attempt to discern
 what Dworkin has famously termed the specific conceptions of given constitutional norms.
 Both prefer, instead, reliance on constitutional text and structure to infer more what
 Dworkin has again famously termed the concept of a constitutional norm. Both, finally,
 are open to invoking the past to help derive a constitutional concept, though Epstein
 commonly does so more aggressively than Dworkin. See Dworkin, supra note 121, at
 34-56.
 That said, one cannot resist the feeling that both Epstein and Dworkin eschew
 undertaking "conceptional" history not only for their stated theoretical reasons, but
 because they assume that history on this level simply will not support their larger projects.
 153. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 96-104 (1993) (noting that
 interpretative theories must be justified by substantive principles) [hereinafter Sunstein,
 The Partial Constitution].
 154. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 26.
 155. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 706.
 156. Id.
 157. The sources cited are: Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the
 Constitution (1938); Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts.
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Wed, 20 Dec 2017 23:36:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1995] HISTORY aLITE" 559
 discussion fares no better. Epstein frames the relevant debate as between
 those arguing that the Framers viewed the Contract Clause as vaguely im-
 portant, and those who contend that the Framers thought it to be incon-
 sequential. There is no hint of how patriot constitutionalism, early state
 experiments, or Federalist reactions do or do not illuminate the Found-
 ing conception of property and contract rights. This failure to justify
 what is a fairly broad assertion could be dismissed as simply a perfunctory
 attempt to bolster what is, in any event, mainly a theoretical point. In
 truth, however, it is better seen as a dress rehearsal for Epstein's use of
 history where he does seek to employ it affirmatively.
 Epstein's main historical performance takes place on a stage far
 more broad than the debates concerning particular clauses. Instead, he
 makes clear that the relevant place on which to focus is the general back-
 ground of the era, an area far too often neglected by legal scholars. In
 Takings Epstein demonstrates his focus more than he proclaims it by de-
 voting a chapter to examining how trends in English philosophy and law
 provide the setting against which to consider the Constitution intelli-
 gently. In "Revitalization," he usefully makes his approach explicit at sev-
 eral points. He writes:
 In order to overcome these historical weaknesses and interpreta-
 tive gaps [on more specific questions], it seems not only proper,
 but necessary, to look beyond the debates over the particular
 clause, to more general and widely shared conceptions of gov-
 ernment and contract, on the theory that they influenced the
 basic constitutional structure.158
 Put another way, concentrating on the general context yields benefits
 that examination of more narrow topics does not. As he explains further,
 "A focus on the eighteenth-century background puts us at one remove
 from the document itself, but it has the compensating advantage of al-
 lowing us to look to a body of insights and shared understandings, many
 of which are on the public record."1159 For Epstein, one example of the
 kind of general topic that might be usefully explored is the Founders'
 attitude toward factions. On this point he notes that "[the framers]
 sought to control those abuses [of faction] by adopting a scheme of lim-
 ited government."6 It is this type of general historical point that can
 yield valid constitutional insight. As Epstein argues the point, "If this
 sketch [about the abuses of faction] captures something of the general
 mood of the time, then it seems quite impossible to infer that the framers
 1-3), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944), and Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the
 Contract Clause, 89 Yale LJ. 1623 (1980). Of these, only Wright devotes any sustained
 attention to the framing of the Contract Clause, and then only at the outset of his work.
 See Wright, supra, at 3-26.
 158. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 754.
 159. Id. at 711.
 160. Id. at 715.
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 intended judicial deference to the legislature on all economic
 matters."161
 In each work the general background, as Epstein perceives it, is
 plain, and oriented toward rights: property rights above all. In Takings
 he declares that the "Lockean system,"-by which he means a commit-
 ment to just compensation for the taking of property for any public use
 other than to provide for external defense and internal order-"was
 dominant at the time when the Constitution was adopted."1'62 Concern-
 ing the Contract Clause, the shared understandings are scarcely less
 plain: the Framers designed the government as they did out of a general
 fear that the governmental decisionmaking processes fall easy prey to fac-
 tions which "can use the mantle of government power to deprive persons
 of their liberty and property," particularly property broadly defined.163
 Against this historical backdrop, the Constitution's basic features
 come into proper focus as ways to safeguard the basic Lockean concep-
 tion of rights that Epstein proffers. In Takings the many familiar struc-
 tural devices in the Constitution-including separation of powers, the
 complex provisions on selecting public officials, the principle of limited
 enumerated powers-were expected to serve the substantive end of pro-
 tecting the "private property, of 'lives, liberties, and estates' that Locke
 considered the purpose of government."l64 Epstein's study of the Con-
 tract Clause likewise casts these structures as mechanisms for securing
 rights, particularly the rights of property broadly understood.'65 In each
 work the specific protections of rights-including the Takings Clause and
 the Contract Clause-bolster these devices by identifying expressly and in
 a judicially enforceable manner the ends of government that the Consti-
 tution's distinctive framework is designed to protect.166
 Such is the broad background case that Epstein considers important
 enough to put forward. He does not, however, put it forward convinc-
 ingly. The problems again begin with his methods. To his credit, he gets
 no basic fact wrong,167 in large part because his interpretative approach
 161. Id.
 162. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16.
 163. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 711.
 164. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 17.
 165. See Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 711-16. The differences that exist
 between this account and that of Takings center on two points. First, "Revitalization" does
 not rely on Locke as the source of the Founders' commitment to property rights, though
 that commitment is fully consistent with Epstein's interpretation of Locke in Takings.
 Second, "Revitalization" emphasizes that, as an intermediate step, the Constitution's
 structural devices served property rights by helping to control self-interested factions. Id.
 166. See Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 716; Epstein, Takings, supra note
 9, at 18.
 167. There are two arguable exceptions. One arises in Takings when Epstein states
 that he will consider the Takings Clause to apply against the states. In part he justifies this
 move because it "is consistent with the basic Lockean design, as is reflected by the inclusion
 of some version of the eminent domain [i.e. Takings] clause in all state constitutions."
 Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 18. This justification, in other words, relies on the
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Wed, 20 Dec 2017 23:36:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1995] HISTORY "LITE" 561
 precludes him from making specific factual claims to begin with. To his
 greater credit, this same interpretive approach causes him to focus on the
 larger eighteenth-century context of the Constitution, normally a good
 thing. The real trouble arises with his approach to the available evidence.
 Nowhere is that approach more problematic than in Takings. To
 support his sweeping claim about the "dominant. . . Lockean system" of
 1787, Epstein makes two evidentiary assertions.'68 First, he argues that
 Locke's "theory of state"-which presumably includes the philosopher's
 thinking about just compensation169-was "adopted in Blackstone's Com-
 mentaries." Yet Epstein has nothing to say about how Blackstone did so,
 where the Commentaries makes this adoption clear, or how the Commenta-
 ries relate to American constitutional thought in the 1760s. In fact, the
 argument that the states currently reflect the "Lockean design" of the Federal
 Constitution. The words "inclusion" and "the" eminent domain clauses aside, the
 highlighted passage in context implies that the states always had such clauses. If the
 Lockean design was "dominant" in the eighteenth century, it would be surprising if any of
 the original states did not have one. The problem for Epstein is that only two states in
 1787 had takings clauses (along with Congress in the Northwest Ordinance). See infra text
 accompanying note 192. Thus, to the extent Epstein means only to discuss current state
 constitutions, his articulation is unclear. To the extent he seeks to imply that the original
 states were "Lockean" in this sense, he is incorrect.
 Epstein's other arguable error-which admittedly falls well outside the history of the
 Founding-arises in his other justification for applying the Takings Clause to the states.
 Here the justification is that: "Limitations against the powers of the states have been
 answered in practice by incorporating specific protections against the states, including the
 eminent domain clause" in Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
 (1896). Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 18. But this is neither the only nor the best
 reading of the case. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court does not rest on the argument
 that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause
 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the Court characterizes the right not to be
 deprived of property for public use without just compensation as inhering in the concept
 of due process. The Court comes to this conclusion not by relying on the Takings Clause
 but instead by discussing principles of republican institutions, the common law, natural
 equity, universal law as well as case law, and treatises relying on these sources. Chicago 166
 U.S. at 235-41. Epstein may mean that Chicago indirectly or in effect incorporated the
 eminent domain clause against the states, but that is not what he says.
 168. To quote the affirmative proposition: "The Lockean system was dominant at the
 time when the Constitution was adopted. His theory of state was adopted in Blackstone's
 Commentaries, and the protection of property against its enemies was a central and
 recurrent feature of the political thought of the day." Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16.
 169. This conception is problematic since, as Epstein admits, Locke himself rested the
 legitimacy of government on a doctrine of implied consent rather than on doctrines of
 restitution and just compensation. See id. at 14-16.
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 Commentaries' reliance on Locke,170 the work's position on takings,171 and
 its influence on American constitutionalism172 are all complex matters
 that fall far short of affording Epstein the simple support he seeks.
 As a measure of just how complex this situation is, consider the mat-
 ter of Blackstone's own position on property. Blackstone does state that
 "the law permits no man, or set of men, to [take private property for
 public use] without the consent of the owner of the land ... [or without]
 giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby
 sustained."''73 But, while supporting a right to just compensation, the
 passage fails to resolve a number of ancillary issues. For one, it is unclear
 whether Blackstone is talking about a right that is judicially enforceable
 or merely aspirational. It is likewise unclear whether the passage aims to
 limit local authorities alone, or Parliament as well. No less important, the
 Commentaries elsewhere take positions that manifestly run counter to at
 least Epstein's version of Locke. First, Blackstone frequently recognizes
 the legitimacy of regulation that diminishes the value of property.174
 Forrest McDonald amplifies this point in a concise yet exhaustively
 researched treatment of English and American property law generally.
 He concludes that "the crucial fact is that ownership did not include the
 absolute right to buy or sell one's property in a free market; that was not a
 part of the scheme of things in eighteenth-century England and
 America."''75 Second, the Commentaries famously declare that Parliament
 is sovereign, which among other things precludes the judicial enforce-
 ment of any fundamental right against an act of that national legislature.
 On this last point, moreover, Blackstone specifically rejects Locke's posi-
 tion that "the people" retain a power to remove or alter the legislature
 under the British Constitution.176
 170. Edward S. Corwin, for example, viewed Blackstone as ultimately a disciple not of
 Locke but of Hobbes. See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
 Constitutional Law 85-87 (1965). The point is not that Corwin is correct (though his use
 of sources is comparatively far more rigorous). Rather, the point is that Epstein fails to see
 that the relationship between Blackstone and Locke is a far more complicated matter than
 his conclusory assertions allow. See also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
 Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 205, 264-72 (1979) (explaining the ways in which
 Blackstone was not a Lockean liberal).
 171. For nuanced discussions of Blackstone on property, see DanielJ. Boorstin, The
 Mysterious Science of the Law 167-87 (1958); Kennedy, supra note 170, at 313-50.
 172. See Bailyn, supra note 57, at 171-75; Boorstin, supra note 171, at 3-4; Stanley N.
 Katz, Introduction to 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at
 xi-xii (1979 facsimile ed.); Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 265.
 173. 1 Blackstone, supra note 172, at *135.
 174. See, e.g., 4 id. at *154-60 (discussing laws prohibiting "offenses against public
 trade"); 4 id. at *170 (discussing sumptuary laws); 1 id. at *187-98, 334 (discussing
 reservation of public property and resources). For that matter, so too, arguably, does
 Locke. See John Locke, Second Treatise, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
 ? 139, at 188 (1965 ed.).
 175. McDonald, supra note 67, at 14.
 176. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 172, at *156-58.
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 Beyond Blackstone, Epstein also attempts to bolster his assertion
 about Lockean dominance with the contention that "the protection of
 private property against its enemies was a central and recurrent feature of
 the political thought of the day."'77 For this proposition he relies on
 Charles Beard's 1912 The Supreme Court and the Constitution178 together
 with a book review and a manuscript byJennifer Nedelsky.179 Leave aside
 the problem that, then or now, not all defenses of property were necessar-
 ily "Lockean." More troubling, in terms of sources, is Epstein's reliance
 on a dated work by a historian whose main thesis has since been eclipsed
 by generations of subsequent work'80-a problem mitigated but not
 eliminated by citation to Nedelsky.'8' The general problem, in short, re-
 mains: Epstein provides support for his major historical claim about
 Locke in almost inverse proportion to the boldness of the claim he
 asserts.
 Matters improve in Epstein's discussion of the Contract Clause, but
 not sufficiently for his assertions to be persuasive on their own terms.
 Here Epstein spends more time developing an argument consistent with
 his general claim that a Lockean view of property dominated contempo-
 raneous thinking.'82 What also drove the Founders to embrace the strat-
 egies of limited government and enumerated rights, he contends, was a
 specific fear of self-interested factions controlling the legislatures.'83 For
 support, Epstein first trots out three of James Madison's oft-cited essays
 from The Federalist: Nos. 10, 44, and 51.184 This is on the right track, just
 not far enough down it. In a marked improvement upon his cryptic use
 of Blackstone's Commentaries, Epstein does make specific reference to
 passages that support his general proposition. What he also does, how-
 ever, is to assume that simply citing James Madison, without more, suf-
 fices as a basis for making grand points about the Founding. In this
 Epstein is hardly alone among legal scholars, yet such a basis would leave
 him a solitary figure among competent history students-which is pre-
 177. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16.
 178. See Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution (1912); Epstein,
 Takings, supra note 9, at 16 n.24.
 179. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16. Later editions add a cite to a Nedelsky
 book review. See id. (1993 ed.).
 180. For Beard's work and the works that have superseded it, see supra text
 accompanying notes 35, 50-114.
 181. Since Epstein first cited her, Nedelsky has established herself as an important
 scholar of property rights during the Founding era. See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Private
 Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and
 its Legacy (1990).
 182. In "Revitalization," Epstein refers to the Founders as "men schooled in Hobbes
 and Locke," for the proposition that they knew government had to exist to constrain the
 use of private force. He does not, however, rely on Locke's overall influence with regard to
 the Founders' solutions as much as he does in Takings. See Epstein, Revitalization, supra
 note 148, at 711.
 183. See id. at 711-16.
 184. See id. at 711, 712 n.27, 714.
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 cisely the point. In fairness, Epstein also supports his claim with a refer-
 ence to self-interested state legislation enacted at the time of the Federal
 Convention.185 Substantively this is a plausible point, especially in light
 of the historical work done in the last twenty-five years.186 Methodologi-
 cally, however, the trouble is that Epstein refers to none of this work in
 making the point, preferring instead to rely on two pages from a mono-
 graph that is nearly fifty years old.'87 Once more, a point about the past
 that is important enough to urge is not necessarily important enough to
 urge persuasively.
 As procedure goes, so does substance. It is, moreover, exactly on the
 level of "general mood" where Epstein's historical assertions run into
 scholarly trouble. In his writings on both takings and contracts,
 Epstein-while nowhere relying on Hartz per se-nonetheless writes as if
 scholarship ceased with The Liberal Tradition in America. But Hartz was
 only the beginning of the contemporary encounter with early American
 ideas. If the past two generations of historical work have settled on any
 point, it is that Lockean political philosophy was not "dominant" in the
 eighteenth century, and certainly not in the straightforward way that
 Epstein sketches. Interestingly, this colossal historiographical fact hurts
 Epstein's overall project in ways he ignores, yet could nonetheless help it
 in ways he fails to seize.
 The potential harm, which is potentially insurmountable, arises from
 the evident patriot commitment to common-law rights and republican
 representation apart from Lockean liberties. Start with rights. John
 Phillip Reid's massive body of scholarship, in particular, challenges the
 claim that Lockean notions of natural property rights, still less Epstein's
 version of Locke, significantly fueled early American defenses of prop-
 erty. Reid and others suggest rather that American Whigs, then patriots,
 and later republicans drew not on Locke but on positive English law. On
 Reid's account, English law, including English property rights, in turn
 derived from doctrines of custom, ancient "original" contracts between
 the rulers and the ruled, and contemporaneous representation.8 As
 will be seen, only the last of these sources made either the law, or still less
 legal rights, a direct function of "deliberative democracy." What should
 be seen here, however, is that these sources did serve as bases for legiti-
 macy in themselves, reflecting the general "consent of the governed."'189
 To the extent they did so, the law that resulted could not provide ajudi-
 cially enforceable remedy for an uncompensated taking by a representa-
 185. See id. at 712.
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 98-114.
 187. The citation, again, is to Wright, supra note 157. This criticism should not be
 taken to mean that Wright's work is inapposite or obsolete. To the contrary, it remains
 perhaps the leading work on that subject. The point is, rather, that Epstein neglects
 subsequent research and analysis; this failure precludes him from placing Wright's insights
 in modern scholarly context.
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92; see generally 1 Reid, supra note 89.
 189. See infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
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 tive legislature, because the act of such a legislature reflected-and, if
 anything, reflected more directly-the same consent of the governed on
 which the right itself was based. Blackstone notwithstanding, English law
 does not seem to have afforded such a right even in a hortatory sense.
 The problems multiply with the question of republican representa-
 tion. Here modern scholarship is far more extensive than it is on English
 rights, in many ways forming the core of recent work on American consti-
 tutionalism. And here Epstein's Lockean paradigm runs directly counter
 to the constitutional strategies that this body of scholarship identifies as
 preeminent in the years following Independence. Chief among these
 strategies was a deepening commitment to representative legitimacy that
 was far more thoroughgoing than anything realistically mooted across the
 Atlantic.190 With regard to property, this republican commitment
 pointed toward-not away from-robust exercises of legislative power.
 American constitutional thought during the Critical Period to a great ex-
 tent viewed representative legislatures, which consequently reflected the
 will of a virtuous populace, as sovereign. Legislative sovereignty won
 champions both as an end in itself, insofar as it realized the value of self-
 government, and as the best means of ensuring liberty, including prop-
 erty and contract rights.'9' It followed that property and contract protec-
 tions against republican legislatures had to be given a narrow scope, if
 indeed any scope at all, because such protections made no sense by defi-
 nition. The people, through their assemblies, simply could not tyrannize
 themselves.
 190. To the contrary, those who argued for Parliamentary reform in either Britain or
 Ireland had a peculiar combination of notoriety and impotence. For British reformers, see
 George Rude, Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774 (1962). For their Irish
 counterparts, see Francis G. James, Ireland in the Empire, 1688-1770, at 182-85 (1973).
 See generally Robbins, supra note 56.
 191. Nedelsky ably summarizes the views of the late HerbertJ. Storing, probably the
 greatest expert on the Constitution's opponents, as holding that the Antifederalists viewed
 republican self-government not as an end in itself, but as a means to protect rights
 independent of democratic process:
 Storing cautions against a misunderstanding of the Anti-Federalists' treatment of
 civic virtue and the common good: for him, these values were important to the
 Anti-Federalists, but the values were merely instrumental to individual liberty. He
 concludes that the Anti-Federalists were liberals "in the decisive sense that they
 saw the end of government as the security of individual liberty, not the promotion
 of virtue or the fostering of some organic common good." Storing thus shares
 the Federalist view that the two groups' differences over the nature of the citizen's
 role in public affairs were essentially disagreements about the best means for
 protecting rights under limited government.
 Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Antifederalists, Federalists, and the
 Constitution, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 340, 344-45 (1982) (reviewing Herbert J. Storing, The
 Complete Anti-Federalist (1981) (citations omitted)). Nedelsky is quick to add that
 Storing undervalues, indeed overlooks, the "high value" that the Antifederalists placed on
 "the citizen's active participation in the affairs of state." Id. at 145. She does not, however,
 dispute the view that the Antifederalists adhered to classical republican tenets as a way to
 protect rights as well.
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 As if all this were not bad enough, not only were these republican
 commitments nearly antithetical to Epstein's vision of Locke, but they
 flourished on Epstein's own chosen terms of "general mood" as much as
 in the context of specific debates and applications. For that matter, the
 same point holds for constitutional text, the area Epstein considers even
 more probative in actually applying the Constitution than general back-
 ground history. Of the available constitutional texts, only two state consti-
 tutions (plus the Northwest Ordinance) included any protection against
 legislative takings,'92 and none included any protection of contracts,'93
 by the time the Federal Convention convened. Nor do the problems end
 here. Probably most Antifederalists, and even a number of their
 Federalist counterparts, carried these republican commitments past
 1787.194 These commitments are still reflected in that part of the consti-
 tutional text which to a significant extent owes its existence to Antifeder-
 alist agitation, the Bill of Rights.195
 Yet if recent scholarship takes away, it also offers in return. The cor-
 nerstone of recent work on the Founding, itself building on Revolution-
 ary scholarship, remains Gordon Wood's insight that the Federalists in
 fundamental ways rejected the republican assumptions especially evident
 in the first state constitutions.'96 This is not to say that the rejection was
 total or final. Nor is it to say that the Federalist rejection of legislative
 sovereignty in particular meant a turn, or return, to Lockean conceptions
 of property and contract rights.197 An account faithful to the sources,
 which scholars such as William Michael Treanor are trying to construct,
 probably points somewhere between these extremes.'98 Yet the point re-
 mains that however extensive the Federalist reaction to the republican
 excesses of the Critical Period, any reaction to legislative control of prop-
 erty and contract cuts Epstein's way. Epstein, moreover, seems dimly
 aware that his case benefits in just this fashion with his passing reference,
 albeit vaguely made and poorly supported, to "much of the state legisla-
 192. See Vt. Const. art. II; Mass. Const. art. X; Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787,
 art. II, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1961). Vermont, moreover, was not truly a state insofar as it was not
 admitted into the Union until 1791. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and
 Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale
 LJ. 694, 702 n.38 (1985).
 193. See generally 2 The Roots of the Bill of Rights 231-382 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
 1980).
 194. Moreover, the procedural safeguards Epstein attributes to the Framers for many
 Federalist advocates cut against substantive judicial protection. See Wood, Creation, supra
 note 14, at 536-42. For an argument that this view persisted through the drafting and
 ratification of the Bill of Rights, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
 Yale LJ. 1131 (1991).
 195. See generally Morris, supra note 104, at 298-320; HerbertJ. Storing, What the
 Anti-federalists Were For 64-70 (1981).
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 108-112.
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
 198. See Treanor, supra note 192, at 702 n.38.
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 tion passed about the time of the Constitutional Convention"199 as one
 reason for the drafting of an explicit clause protecting the obligation of
 contracts. The last generation's reassessments of early American constitu-
 tionalism offer Epstein the opportunity to advance this position far more
 credibly than he does, though perhaps far less completely than he might
 wish. As with historical propositions uncongenial to his agenda, however,
 this is one offer that in these two works Epstein seems indifferent about
 accepting.
 C. Behind the Republican Revival
 From here, appeals to history could only become more convincing,
 especially if they took on board any cargo at all from recent historical
 scholarship. A number of theorists have exploited this opportunity under
 the banner of "modern" or "neo-republicanism."200 Of these, perhaps
 the most influential and evidently the most prolific, though not necessar-
 ily the most historically minded,201 has been Cass Sunstein, much of
 whose early work202 recently culminated in his landmark The Partial
 Constitution.203 As a leading "neo-republican," Sunstein seeks to shift con-
 stitutional reform away from the courts "to administrative and legislative
 bodies, and to democratic arenas generally."204 In part, this move reflects
 a disillusionment with the Warren Court's perceived inability to translate
 high ideals into broadly supported social commitments;205 in part it re-
 199. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 712.
 200. See supra note 20.
 201. That title-and nearly the title of most prolific-would have to go to Akhil Reed
 Amar. Some of Amar's principal works include the following: The Consent of the
 Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994)
 [hereinafter Amar, Consent]; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale
 LJ. 1193 (1992); The Bill of Rights, supra note 194; The Two-Tiered Structure of the
 Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (1990); Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
 the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988); Our Forgotten
 Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 Yale LJ. 281 (1987); Of Sovereignty and
 Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425 (1987).
 202. A by no means exhaustive list of Sunstein's works includes the following: Free
 Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1992); Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special
 Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1992);
 Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's
 Legacy]; Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984).
 203. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153.
 204. Id. at 9-10. In this Sunstein echoes the call made a century earlier by James
 Bradley Thayer, who attempted to limit the scope ofjudicial review and thus increase the
 arena for progressive democratic reform. SeeJames B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
 the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 155-56 (1893); cf.
 James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 240
 (1993) (observing that "Sunstein has made his own plea to be the Thayer for the next
 generation").
 205. The now classic work in this regard is Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
 Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991); see also Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts
 and Social Policy (1977).
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 sponds to dispiriting interest-group pluralistic accounts of political behav-
 ior put forward by Sunstein's law and economics colleagues at the
 University of Chicago and elsewhere;206 and in part it stems from the pre-
 Clinton expectation that an anti-progressive ethos would dominate the
 Supreme Court into the next century.207
 Whatever its origins, Sunstein's modern republican agenda fits well
 with certain themes coming out of early American constitutionalism. But
 this partial fit came with a built-in temptation to be partial, that is, to
 invoke only those themes that provide support. Rather than look to
 England, Locke, and rights, Sunstein looks mainly to the Continent, im-
 plicitly to Machiavelli, and self-confidently to the classical republican ten-
 ets of self-government. Procedurally, the results represent a substantial
 improvement over Epstein, but are nonetheless flawed in important ways.
 Substantively, Sunstein's use of history is likewise more sophisticated yet
 one-sided.
 Sunstein refuses to be ruled by history, but he does like to have it on
 his side. He is no originalist. Using Bork's The Tempting of America as the
 stand-in,208 he has rejected the view that the intentions of the Framers
 should dictate constitutional interpretation. But Sunstein may accurately
 be called a historicist.209 As such, he has argued that the "future of Amer-
 ican public law depends in significant part on the way that its tradition is
 understood."'210 His own work, especially the work that led up to The
 Partial Constitution, commonly includes more than a perfunctory appeal
 to the views of the Founders. To take one example, Sunstein's important
 206. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent:
 Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to
 Democratic Theory (1956); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 276-78,
 354-55, 359-60 (1990); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 167
 (1988).
 207. See Cass R. Sunstein, WhatJudge Bork Should Have Said, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 205
 (1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Judge Bork].
 208. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 96-110; see also
 Sunstein, Judge Bork, supra note 207. This strategy is not without its problems, largely
 because it gives Sunstein too easy a target. Sunstein rightly points out that Bork cannot
 justify reliance on original intent by relying on original intent without falling prey to
 obvious circularity. He also correctly notes that Bork's attempts to justify originalism with
 reference to democratic theory are thin and conclusory. Having dispensed with Bork,
 Sunstein nonetheless fails to consider whether more sophisticated defenses of originalism
 must likewise fail. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
 Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226
 (1988).
 209. For present purposes, a historicist may be defined as one who thinks history is
 important. See Nelson, supra note 124, at 459 n.57.
 210. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1563 (1988)
 [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival]. Along these lines Sunstein
 specifically asserts that "the importance of Madison for current constitutional controversy
 does not depend solely on the quality of Madison's thought" but also on his role as a major
 figure in American constitutional tradition. Id.
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 article, "Beyond the Republican Revival,"211 which contains some of his
 most thorough historical invocations, contains numerous passages at-
 tempting to relate "modern historical scholarship ... of the role of re-
 publican thought in the period before, during, and after the ratification
 of the American Constitution" to his own "particular version of republi-
 can thought, one that avoids some of the difficulties associated with com-
 peting conceptions of public life, both republican and antirepubli-
 can."9212 Nor is The Partial Constitution itself any exception. The body of
 the work commences with a brief but prominent consideration of what
 "the framers of the American Constitution sought to create," by "set[ting]
 out certain ideas that [played] a prominent role in the founding pe-
 riod."9213 For these reasons, the following examination will focus on these
 two works.
 In each, Sunstein prefaces his accounts of the Founding with declara-
 tions of balance over partiality.214 In stark contrast to Epstein, he pro-
 claims that " [t] here can be little doubt that elements of both pluralist and
 republican thought played a role during the period of the constitutional
 framing."9215 In fact, Sunstein continues, "[t] he opposition between lib-
 eral and republican thought in the context of the framing is ... largely a
 false one."9216 Multifaceted thought, moreover, translated into a mul-
 tifaceted framework. "What emerged is in several respects a hybrid,"
 composed of a number of competing elements "in the theory of politics
 embodied in the American Constitution."9217
 Sunstein makes the character of this hybrid especially clear when he
 recounts the Founders' understanding of society. On his view, many of
 the Founders moved beyond the classical republican position that civic
 virtue could be the primary basis for representative government. Citing
 John Adams, Noah Webster, and Patrick Henry, Sunstein notes that
 Adams in particular was "quite skeptical about the idea that anything
 other than self-interest could be the basis for political behavior."218 In
 Madison and Hamilton he observes a certain "skepticism about important
 elements of classical republican thought."9219 But if the Founders were no
 longer classical republicans, Sunstein continues, neither were they "lib-
 211. See id.
 212. Id. at 1540-41; see also id. at 1548-51, 1558-64, 1566-67.
 213. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18.
 214. The emphasis on historical balance and complexity described in this paragraph
 appears mainly in "Beyond the Republican Revival"; it all but disappears by the time of The
 Partial Constitution.
 215. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1558.
 216. Id. at 1567. As the previous two passages make clear, Sunstein sometimes uses
 "liberalism" and interest-group "pluralism" interchangeably, especially when speaking of
 the Founding. Nonetheless, he clearly rejects the notion that "liberalism" necessarily, or
 even primarily, entails interest group pluralism. See id. at 1541, 1566-71.
 217. Id. at 1561.
 218. Id. at 1558 (footnote omitted).
 219. Id.
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 eral" interest-group pluralists. They did not abandon certain traditional
 republican beliefs, in particular the "belief in deliberative government
 and the need for civic virtue."220 Instead "[t]hey attempted to carry for-
 ward the classical republican belief in virtue-a word that appears
 throughout the period-but to do so in a way that responded realistically,
 not romantically, to likely difficulties in the real world of political life."'22'
 In consequence, Sunstein asserts, "the framers' conception of human na-
 ture synthesized elements of classical republicanism with its emerging in-
 terest-group competitor."222
 The hybrid nature of the account begins to fade, however, when Sun-
 stein shifts from the Founders' translation of their descriptions of society
 into prescriptions for government. For Sunstein, the Founders' intellec-
 tual inheritance above all led them to seek "a republic of reasons."223 In
 this they responded to three related evils: monarchy, corruption, and fac-
 tion. With the Revolution, Americans rejected the "monarchical legacy"
 of England, which Sunstein defines as the traditional belief in a natural
 order in society.224 The Founders likewise repudiated self-interested rep-
 resentation by government officials, whether "corruption" in the modern
 sense of bribery or "corruption" in the eighteenth-century meaning of
 officials aggrandizing their own powers at the expense of the people as a
 whole.225 Yet most importantly, in Sunstein's estimation, the Founders
 attempted to create a system that would limit the power of self-interested
 private groups or factions because "on their view, even an insistent major-
 ity should not have its way, if power was the only thing to be invoked on
 its behalf."226 This last lesson in particular arose out of the unhappy
 reign of factions in the states during the Critical Period. A republic of
 reasons, otherwise known as a "deliberative democracy," would combat
 these evils by ruling out of bounds the justification of any government
 action with reference to private interest or to nature, as opposed to the
 common good. In this way, deliberative democracy reflected an ongoing
 commitment to the idea of civic virtue that was central to classical repub-
 licanism. On this account, for the Founders, "[t]he basic institutions of
 the resulting Constitution were intended to encourage and to profit from
 deliberation."227 Thus, what Epstein views as mechanisms to serve Lock-
 ean rights,228 Sunstein sees as means to promote a "Republic of Rea-
 220. Id. at 1558-59.
 221. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21.
 222. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1561.
 223. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 17.
 224. See id. at 19.
 225. See id. Sunstein, in distinguishing between "[a]ctual corruption" and general
 self-aggrandizement, apparently is unaware of the broader eighteenth-century meaning of
 "corruption." For discussions of "corruption" in the broader sense, see Lewis Namier,
 England in the Age of the American Revolution (2d ed. 1961); Bailyn, supra note 57.
 226. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 19.
 227. Id. at 23.
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 162-166.
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 sons."229 Checks and balances, bicameralism, presentment and the Presi-
 dential veto, federalism, the election of Senators by the state legislatures,
 the selection of the President by the Electoral College-all of these famil-
 iar mechanisms came into being primarily, if not exclusively, to insure
 that no government action could occur without the thorough airing of
 different perspectives aimed at advancing the common good.230 Judicial
 review, too, would safeguard deliberation by protecting the considered
 judgments of the people, embodied in constitutional law, against the
 transitory, ill-considered actions of public officials. Even the Founding
 concern for many, if not most, rights arose from the commitment to de-
 liberation. "What is distinctive about the republican view is that it under-
 stands most rights"-Sunstein typically mentions freedom of speech, the
 right to vote, and trial by jury-"as either the preconditions for or the
 outcome of an undistorted deliberative process."'231 By each of these
 means the Founders sought "to promote deliberation and to limit the risk
 that public officials would be mouthpieces for constituent interests."232
 These same points apply to Founding strategies that Sunstein con-
 cedes at least at first blush look like repudiations of classical republican
 commitments. The Federalists thus turned on its head the notion that
 civic virtue sufficient for public-spirited deliberation could flourish only
 in small republics, by arguing that in large republics, factions would can-
 cel one another out.233 Sunstein notes that the Federalists likewise re-
 jected the traditional commitment to homogeneous republics by con-
 tending that the clash of perspectives in a heterogeneous land would
 promote deliberation.234 By these means, Sunstein concludes, the Foun-
 ders not only maintained their commitment to deliberation, but also
 "modernized the classical republican belief in civic virtue."235
 In procedural terms, Sunstein makes his case more persuasively than
 Epstein in almost every way. As with Epstein, simple factual accuracy is
 largely beside the point, since Sunstein also makes few specific factual
 assertions. By contrast, Sunstein seizes the opportunity that the redis-
 covery of early American constitutionalism presents. Not surprisingly-
 though frustratingly-this is more evident in the articles that led to The
 Partial Constitution than in the book itself, but it is sufficiently prominent
 229. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 17, 24.
 230. See id. at 23.
 231. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1551. Sunstein
 later, and somewhat ambiguously, notes that "[m]any of the original constitutional rights
 provide spheres of private autonomy to be insulated from government interference; ...
 some of [these rights] are more easily understood as an outgrowth of Lockean ideas," even
 though "such rights can be [and were?] justified in republican fashion." Id. at 1562.
 232. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21-22.
 233. See id. at 20-21.
 234. See id. at 24.
 235. See id. at 20.
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 in both.236 Consider first the use of primary sources. In neither the book
 nor the articles does Sunstein lean solely on the totemic Federalist.
 Rather, he relies extensively on letters, papers, and pamphlets written not
 just by the Madisons and Hamiltons,237 but by less familiar yet important
 figures such as John Witherspoon and Benjamin Rush.238 In so doing,
 Sunstein makes use of recent primary source collections that are them-
 selves a result of current scholarly interest.239 His case is even more im-
 pressive with reference to secondary works. Present and accounted for
 are Hartz, Wood, Bailyn, Pocock, and Appleby, along with numerous
 other important historians.240 It is, moreover, a tonic to see the William
 and Mary Quarterly, perhaps the leading professional journal of early
 American history and culture, cited in a law review piece discussing early
 American constitutionalism.24'
 Sunstein's command of sources in turn promises a special sensitivity
 to context. In both his articles and his book Sunstein acknowledges that
 there is a far bigger picture than any of his brief historical treatments can
 adequately paint. He ostensibly addresses this problem first by sketching
 in those parts of the canvas relevant to his main account. As noted,
 Sunstein glances back toward the Revolution to note that the Founders'
 republican solutions in important ways moved beyond certain traditional
 republican strategies, such as the commitment to small polities. In simi-
 lar fashion, Sunstein offers a glimpse past the Founding to show how
 Madison's brand of republicanism partially anticipated, but more impor-
 tantly differed from, the interest-group pluralism that many historians ar-
 gue later took root in American society.242 More generally, Sunstein fur-
 ther deals with the problem of context by sounding general caveats. The
 Partial Constitution, in particular, laudably warns that "[i]n light of the
 sheer diversity of influential ideas, any description of the framing com-
 236. The transition from law review article to legal monograph commonly entails
 streamlining" the footnotes by deleting citations. This practice is frustrating with regard
 to legal works discussing history insofar as historical persuasiveness in particular turns on
 how thoroughly the evidence is presented. It is doubly problematic for theorists like
 Ackerman, who are more heavily reliant on history than either Epstein or Sunstein. See
 infra text accompanying notes 285-290.
 237. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 19-21; Sunstein,
 Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1558-63.
 238. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 22-24; Sunstein,
 Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1540 n.1, 1566 n.151.
 239. For example, Sunstein relies on Herbert J. Storing's important multivolume
 collection, The Complete Antifederalist. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
 supra note 210, at 1556 n.91. For a discussion of developments in primary source
 materials, see Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1569-78.
 240. Others include Lance Banning, Martin Diamond, Jackson Turner Main, and
 Thomas Pangle. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 359 n.8;
 Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1540 n.3, 1558 n.108, 1566
 n.153.
 241. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1540 n.3.
 242. See id. at 1558-64.
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 mitments will have to be selective. It will inevitably downplay certain ele-
 ments and emphasize others."243
 The promise of concern for context, however, is not the same thing
 as concern itself, and it is here that the problems with Sunstein's am
 proach begin. For all his talk of the bigger picture, Sunstein actually ad-
 dresses few aspects of it. Troubling enough is the "glancing" manner in
 which Sunstein approaches what is his main topic, republicanism. His
 brief treatments of classical republicanism, to say nothing of its role in
 the Revolution and flowering during the Critical Period, do little to situ-
 ate the subsequent "Madisonian" republicanism he describes. Why the
 Antifederalists clung to the "traditional" republican model, why the
 Federalists transformed it, and what the overall differences were between
 the two remain unclear. Even more sketchy is Sunstein's description of
 the origins and nature of republicanism's main "competitor": liberal, in-
 terest-group pluralism, which, however uncongenial to many of his theo-
 retical commitments, he acknowledges to have formed an important
 component of Federalist thought.244
 But more troubling is what he does not address. Showing laudable
 candor, Sunstein acknowledges that his historical account simply will not
 deal with contemporaneous beliefs in ideas such as "aristocratic rule ...
 agrarian populism .. . interest-group warfare . .. radical centralization of
 politics in the national government . . . racial and sexual hierarchy . . .
 Calvinism ... [and] natural rights," to name a few.245 Giving an adequate
 sense of the Founders' constitutional world may be possible without refer-
 ence to a number of these concepts.246 But it is not possible without
 those that are central to that world. Of those he mentions, the Founding
 commitment to natural rights247-and more generally, rights conceived
 as distinct from or even in tension with deliberative democracy-would
 243. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18.
 244. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1561; Sunstein,
 Interest Groups, supra note 20, at 39.
 245. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18; see also Sunstein,
 Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1539-40 (noting difficulties of "modern
 efforts to revive principles of classical republicanism").
 246. For example, Calvinism arguably played at best a muted role in constitutional
 deliberations in the late eighteenth century, especially among Enlightenment theists like
 Jefferson. See Bailyn, supra note 63, at 32-33. But see Morgan, supra note 80, at 34-43
 (suggesting that the legacy of Puritanism was important to American Revolutionary
 thought).
 247. Sunstein is well-known for his attack on the idea of natural or "pre-political"
 rights as a matter of theory. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 4-7,
 40-92; Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 202, at 885. By contrast, his discussion of
 natural rights as a matter of history is all but non-existent. The most he has to say in either
 The Partial Constitution or "Beyond the Republican Revival" is: "Many of the original
 constitutional rights provide spheres of private autonomy to be insulated from government
 interference; such rights can be justified in republican fashion, but some of them are more
 easily understood as an outgrowth of Lockean ideas. Other rights can be read as
 straightforwardly republican in inspiration." Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
 supra note 210, at 1562.
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 make any shortlist of essentials. Caveats, however laudable, simply cannot
 salvage a historical account so highly selective that it omits critical pieces
 of the structure it needs to rebuild.
 Nor is the prerogative of deciding what counts as critical Sunstein's;
 rather, it is the decision of those whose legacy he has undertaken to de-
 scribe. Try though he might, Sunstein does not, and perhaps cannot,
 succeed in limiting his description to "certain ideas that did play a promi-
 nent role in the founding period and that are especially well suited to
 those of us now in search of a usable past."248 This strategy might have
 worked had Sunstein invoked the Founders solely as one might cite
 Antonio Gramsci or Michel Foucault, that is, on the strength of the use-
 fulness of ideas put forward by thinkers who otherwise have no direct
 connection to our constitutional culture. But Sunstein invokes the Foun-
 ders for something more, namely the authority that springs from their
 historical connection with a document and the culture it continues to
 shape.249 Given this historicist commitment, even the most explicit dis-
 claimers almost inevitably fail. As an initial matter, it seems doubtful that
 most readers would expect that a historical sketch about the Founding
 would omit ideas that the Founders themselves thought were part of their
 core understanding of the Constitution (or, for that matter, that were
 directly relevant to contemporary theories challenging the author's
 own).250 More tellingly, Sunstein's account belies his caveats in any case.
 To claim, for example, that the Constitution was designed to establish a
 republic of reasons "[a]bove all,"25' confirms the expectation that any
 themes the Founders thought basic to their achievement not only have
 been considered but would have been considered expressly.252 In these
 circumstances, neither Sunstein nor any other theorist can freely pick
 and choose what ideas to recount merely on the grounds of usefulness.
 To do so necessarily runs the risk of mischaracterization. Consider a
 potential modern example. A student decides that an account of modern
 constitutional theorists will help the project she has undertaken not only
 because they furnish certain ideas she finds useful, but also because their
 prominence adds authority to the project. Despite caveats that she will be
 necessarily selective in her treatment of individual works, she makes clear
 that her account will be descriptive and effectively gives rise to the expec-
 tation that she will not omit ideas that are central to a particular thinker.
 She then characterizes The Partial Constitution's theory of deliberative de-
 mocracy almost exclusively in terms of its commitment to government
 248. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18.
 249. See supra text accompanying note 213.
 250. Sunstein mentions Epstein's rights-based theory in exactly this regard. See
 Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21, 359 n.9.
 251. Id. at 19-20.
 252. Likewise, repeatedly referring to what "the framers" collectively thought, sought,
 and established also tends to confirm this expectation. See id. at 18-24; see also Sunstein,
 Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1558-64 (discussing the Framers'
 conception of representation and its relation to elements of republican thought).
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 regulation, calling it "mainly a framework of regulatory reinvigoration."
 The student's account, however, all but omits Sunstein's central concern
 for an array of rights as preconditions for deliberative self-government.253
 When Sunstein fails to include at least those concepts the Founders made
 clear were integral to constitutional understanding-at a minimum "non-
 deliberative" rights-he inadvertently does to that understanding what
 the student has inadvertently done to his theory.
 Perhaps not surprisingly, Sunstein's methods yield substance that is
 in many respects balanced, yet in others-often the more important
 ones-is one-sided. The balance in Sunstein's account emerges most no-
 tably where he demonstrates the hybrid nature of the Founding most
 convincingly-his treatment of the Founders' understandings of human
 nature and society.254 By arguing that the Founders retained the belief
 that virtue could still form a basis for government, Sunstein clearly ac-
 knowledges the continuing legacy of the classical republicanism recon-
 structed above all by Pocock.255 Yet, by acknowledging that the Founders
 had also become skeptical of that legacy, Sunstein not only refuses to
 abandon the "touch of rightness" in earlier liberal accounts but also effec-
 tively picks up Gordon Wood's insight that the Critical Period hastened
 this skepticism.256 Particularly convincing in this regard is Sunstein's reli-
 ance on The Radicalism of the American Revolution,257 in which Wood moves
 beyond Creation's preoccupation with government to focus on early
 American understandings of society.258
 Government, however, remains the focus of constitutional history
 and theory alike, and it is here that Sunstein's problems begin. Unlike
 the Founders themselves, he does not translate this more synthetic view
 of human behavior to the problem of setting up institutions that would
 balance power and liberty. Viewed against the sweep of early American
 constitutional scholarship, the description he advances gives short shrift
 to those "non-republican" ideas that the Founders themselves viewed as
 central to American constitutional development, but which had little to
 do with the deliberative democracy he recounts. This is not to say that
 Sunstein's account is merely the civic republican analogue to Epstein's
 tale of Lockean liberalism. In stark contrast to Sunstein, Epstein neither
 notes the last quarter-century of scholarly work nor acknowledges the
 complexity of the world that work depicts.259 Even so, the substantive
 253. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 133-41; James E.
 Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 241-79 (1993);
 Cass R. Sunstein, Response, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
 305, 305-13 (1993).
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 218-222.
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79, 235.
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 218-222.
 257. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 13; see Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra
 note 153, at 18-27 nn.1, 2, 5, 8, 21 & 24.
 258. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
 259. See supra text accompanying notes 182-187.
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 problems with Sunstein's account remain. Contrary to H. Jefferson
 Powell, the difficulty is not that Sunstein advances a "hybrid" liberal/re-
 publican Founding that cannot "serve as a corrective to concepts that it
 already embodied," such as interest-group pluralism, which Sunstein
 would like to correct.260 Rather, the problem is that Sunstein speaks of a
 historical "hybrid," but talks only about its deliberative democratic aspects
 when he considers governmental institutions and the ideas underlying
 them.261
 This problem emerges most clearly by looking first at institutions,
 then to ideas. Recall that Sunstein views the principle Founding de-
 vices-checks and balances, federalism, bicameralism, presentment, even
 judicial review-all but exclusively in a republican light, as means to pro-
 mote deliberative democracy. Recall, too, that Sunstein concedes that
 certain other strategies, especially Federalist acceptance of large and het-
 erogeneous republics, rejected the contrary traditional republican "pre-
 scriptions," but reflected an ongoing republican commitment to the goal
 of marshalling sufficient civic virtue to sustain a "republic of reasons."
 Had Sunstein's method been less selective, however, he would have
 pointed out that nearly all the mechanisms the Federalists proffered were
 to some extent repudiations of classical republican devices. Nowhere
 were these earlier devices more evident than in the first state constitu-
 tions such as Pennsylvania's. As noted, that state's 1776 constitution fea-
 tured, among other stratagems: a powerful unicameral legislature; a
 weak multiple executive; a dependent judiciary; annual elections; rota-
 tion in office; even a requirement that pending bills be posted on the
 statehouse door to facilitate public discussion.262 In rendering
 Pennsylvania's government more representative than nearly any other
 government on earth, these devices reflected a profound belief in the
 people's capacity to engage in deliberative, virtuous, self-government.
 Yet, just eleven years later, the national Constitution's architects treated
 each of Pennsylvania's republican solutions as outmoded failures.
 Sunstein's failure to place Founding institutions in sufficient context
 has important implications for his account of Founding theory. Sunstein,
 of course, could reply that his institutional treatment is harmless error.
 That is, he could contend that checks, balances, bicameralism, and the
 rest were like the newfangled commitment to large, heterogeneous poli-
 ties-"modernized" prescriptions that reflected an ongoing, though not
 necessarily exclusive, commitment to the goal of virtuous, deliberative de-
 mocracy. And were he to say this, he would have significant scholarly
 260. H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1703, 1707 (1988).
 261. James Fleming recently pointed to a similar theoretical one-sidedness in
 Sunstein's work, observing, "Sunstein's liberal republicanism . . . represents a flight from
 giving effect to substantive liberties to perfecting processes [of self-government]."
 Fleming, supra note 253, at 260, 256-60.
 262. See Pa. Const. of 1776 ?? 2, 9, 11, 19, 23. See generally Wood, Creation, supra
 note 14, at 132-42 (discussing the formation of state constitutions and governments).
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 support.263 Yet so dramatic a repudiation of classical republican institu-
 tions suggests something beyond mere tinkering with new means to the
 same end. At the very least, it implies that the "republican" end either
 had changed or was more complicated to begin with. On just this point
 Sunstein's account runs headlong into scholarly themes that are, if not
 "liberal," then surely not "republican."
 One theme concerns rights. Had Sunstein looked back more fully,
 he would have seen that early American constitutionalism centrally fea-
 tured a commitment to rights understood neither as "the preconditions
 [n]or the outcome of an undistorted deliberative process." Part of this
 commitment had to do with natural law. For all that their work marginal-
 ized Locke, Bailyn and Wood agree that Americans viewed natural rights
 as a constraint on sovereign power.264 But-and this point is critical-
 probably a greater part of the commitment to rights had to do with
 nondeliberative positive law. Here Reid's work convincingly argues that
 Americans approached the Revolution in the belief that English law de-
 fined and protected rights through accumulated custom as well as
 through foundational contracts between the rulers and the ruled, exter-
 nal constraints having little to do with deliberative self-government in
 Sunstein's sense.265 Moreover, greater attention to the prevailing narra-
 263. See Pocock, supra note 72, at 526-31.
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 98-100; Bailyn, supra note 63, at 27-34;
 Morgan, supra note 107, at 289-91; Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 3-10.
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 188-189. Non-deliberative positive law has
 several important consequences for Sunstein's work. First, Sunstein cannot invoke it as
 support for his conception of rights as the outcome of deliberative processes. The
 problem is that custom and contract were seen as sources of law that could serve as
 benchmarks for legislative misconduct, however deliberative, but which were themselves
 the products not of deliberation but of experience. Rights derived from contract or
 custom, therefore, were not results of deliberative self-government in any straightforward
 way. (Conversely, for Epstein the problem is that these sources of rights nonetheless
 broadly reflect the "consent of the governed," as evidenced ill the governed's ongoing
 acquiescence, and thus did not provide the grounds for a judicially enforceable limit on
 legislative action that itself reflected consent through representation. See supra text
 accompanying notes 188-189.)
 Second, Sunstein has yet to refute the possibility that non-deliberative positive law as
 used here did or can identify rights unrelated to deliberative democracy. Sunstein does, to
 be sure, reject the notion that the Constitution necessarily adopts "common law baselines"
 as the reference point for neutral adjudication. "Common law baselines," however, should
 not be confused with English rights derived from custom and contract. What Sunstein
 attacks refers to legal arrangements which presume that the existing distribution of wealth,
 income, and preferences reflects a natural pre-political order. See Sunstein, The Partial
 Constitution, supra note 153, at 3-4, 40-92. What Reid describes are constraints on
 governmental action that Anglo-American legal (and thus post-political) culture over time
 recognized as essential to individual liberty, regardless of their connection to deliberation.
 See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
 Finally, Sunstein might well have to acknowledge that other rights which he
 characterizes as "straightforwardly republican" were in fact themselves hybrid. Sunstein,
 Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1562. Take for example, the right
 considered preeminent at the time of the Revolution-the right to trial by jury of the
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 tive from the Revolution to the Founding would have revealed the Consti-
 tution as more than simply a reaction to the emergence of factions dur-
 ing the Critical Period. It would have further shown the document as a
 response to the attacks mounted by these factions on rights understood,
 at least in part, in the non-deliberative ways just recounted. Put another
 way, the problem with factions was not simply that they were self-inter-
 ested. The problem was that they were self-interested in a way that in-
 fringed rights conceived of as either natural or dating from time
 immemorial.266
 One further "nonrepublican" theme relating to government involves
 another facet of the Federalist reaction that current scholarship de-
 scribes. Sunstein's central ongoing commitment to republican virtue is
 precisely what the reigning narrative of the Founding denies, a denial
 strengthened by the Revolutionary background to that narrative. Wood's
 Creation, among other works, quotes dozens of historical actors who by
 the late 1780s came to doubt America's capacity for an overarching com-
 mitment to the public good.267 As Washington put it as early as 1776,
 "The few ... who act upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, compara-
 tively speaking, no more than a drop in the Ocean."268 By 1791, certain
 thinkers, including Madison and James Wilson, at least arguably no
 longer viewed civic virtue as the primary organizing principle for daily
 government. For them, "America would remain free not because of any
 quality in its citizens of spartan self-sacrifice to some nebulous public
 good, but in the last analysis because of the concern each individual
 would have in his own self-interest and personal freedom."269 Sunstein
 follows Wood's recent work in arguing that even the hard-headed
 Madison was no interest-group pluralist in the modern sense.270
 Although it is not entirely clear, there is good reason to believe that
 vicinage. Sunstein correctly notes that this right safeguarded and promoted civic virtue
 and local participation in the administration of law. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 67, at
 40-41 (noting that "juries were the government, and it was upon them that the safety of all
 rights to liberty and property depended"). He fails to consider, however, the possibility
 that this right was also considered an individual's entitlement largely unrelated to the
 republican values just mentioned. For example, when the patriots protested against
 Parliament's revival of a statute of Henry VIII mandating that treason trials take place in
 the "realm"-their ire was directed less at a loss of local governmental control than it was
 focused on the distressing possibility that individual Americans would be transported 3,000
 miles to be tried and probably convicted before a panel of strangers, and thus be deprived
 of their liberty. See 1 Reid, supra note 89, at 54-55; see generally id. at 47-64.
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 98-114.
 267. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 413-24; see generally Morgan, supra note
 107, at 239-62 (discussing early efforts of the American Revolutionaries to fashion a
 representative government).
 268. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (John Hancock)
 (Sept. 24, 1776), in 6 The Writings of George Washington 106, 108 (John C. Fitzpatrick
 ed., 1932).
 269. Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 612.
 270. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21; Wood, Radicalism,
 supra note 13, at 253-62.
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 America's constitutional experiences from the Revolution through the
 Critical Period to the Founding resulted in greater skepticism as to the
 role of public-regarding deliberation than Sunstein allows. Sunstein,
 however, fails to acknowledge this possibility.
 In the end, the one-sidedness of his account calls into question
 whether Sunstein adequately recounts the Founding in the way he in ef-
 fect promises. Powell, for one, has answered that question in the nega-
 tive, suggesting that "Sunstein does not offer us historical republicanism
 [or, more relevantly, Federalism] and commend its virtues to us; he offers
 us a contemporary political theory and notes that at times the founders
 said similar things."'271 In one sense, this method is better than Epstein's
 procedure. Sunstein never claims that he is describing the age's "general
 mood," ostensibly oblivious to other, often contrary material, and thus
 unaware of the need to make intelligent selections in the first place. Yet
 in another sense, Sunstein's approach is more frustrating precisely be-
 cause he gives short shrift to material that is central to the "liberal repub-
 lican" sketch he offers. Sunstein might plausibly respond that his ulti-
 mate concern is the "contemporary political theory." But the fact
 remains that he offers an account of history to bolster that theory. No
 more than any other theorist can he invoke history in this way while es-
 caping historical censure.
 D. Look Homeward, Publians
 The prospect of something better comes from a source that is both
 surprising and expected. For much of his early career, Bruce Ackerman
 wrote as a comparatively ahistorical political philosopher in the manner
 of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. This focus, while Ackerman has
 hardly abandoned it, culminated in the well-known SocialJustice in the Lib-
 eral State.272 By contrast, for the past ten years, Ackerman has concen-
 trated on American constitutional theory in a dramatically historicist fash-
 ion. This concentration has produced his ongoing We the People project,
 in which he has preached the utility of searching for distinctively Ameri-
 can solutions to the problem of self-governance. The project's place in
 Ackerman's work and its historicist approach make the major articles and
 one volume that so far comprise it ideal for consideration.273 The result
 is a substantial advance in the historical credibility of constitutional the-
 ory. Not that the advance is linear. Procedurally, the breadth of Acker-
 man's research does not match its depth, especially at points where it
 matters most. Substantively, however, his work remains significantly-
 and compared to many other theorists, significantly more-faithful to
 271. Powell, supra note 260, at 1707.
 272. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980).
 273. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19. Two articles in particular
 prefigured the monograph: Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,
 99 Yale LJ. 453 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
 Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures].
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 the themes of both rights and self-government that are central to the pre-
 vailing historical narratives.274
 It had better. For Ackerman, "fit," to borrow a term from Dwor-
 kin,275 is everything-in particular, the fit of American constitutional the-
 ory to American constitutional tradition.276 Fit in this sense matters on
 two levels, each of which leads Ackerman to rely heavily on history and
 historical scholarship. First, as a background consideration, Ackerman
 assumes that the American citizenry, bench, and bar all share a tradi-
 tional commitment to democratic positivism and a weakness for at least
 some version of originalism. In his words, "Americans routinely treat the
 constitutional past as if it contained valuable clues for decoding the
 meaning of our political present."277 We the People and its forebears con-
 sequently adopt these theoretical stances to address citizens, judges, and
 lawyers on what are stipulated to be their own terms. Ackerman, at least
 in the works considered, does not really make these assumptions clear;
 still less does he defend them. These lapses have left him open to a con-
 siderable amount of criticism from fellow theorists.278 Yet what matters
 here is that these are the theoretical tenets his project in effect adopts.
 These democratic, positivist, and originalist tenets make fit matter in
 a second, more explicit way. As with any theory that relies on the inten-
 tions of those who adopted constitutional norms, the critical question be-
 comes how well a given interpretation of those norms comports with the
 adopters' intentions.279 The We the People project consequently sets out to
 do nothing less than rediscover a distinctive American constitutionalism
 "by reflecting on the course of its historical development over the past
 two centuries."280 Ackerman's mostly implicit theoretical commitments
 274. In this Ackerman may be unusual but not alone. Mark Tushnet, for example, is
 similarly conscious of what recent scholarship has to say about the Founding's central
 commitment to both rights and republican self-government. See Mark Tushnet, Red,
 White, and Blue, 4-17 (1988). Tushnet, moreover, relies on key historical and
 historiographical works in making this point. See id. That said, Tushnet disputes at least
 one of Ackerman's contentions-that constitutional politics are of a different order than
 ordinary politics-on both historical and theoretical grounds. See id. at 26. For a
 discussion of Ackerman's distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 279-284.
 275. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 121, at 34-38, 143-45 (distinguishing fit and
 political morality as the two dimensions of justification of theories underlying legal
 systems).
 276. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Remarks at the New York University School of Law
 Colloquium on Constitutional Theory (Nov. 16, 1993) (colloquy between Bruce Ackerman
 and Ronald Dworkin).
 277. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 5.
 278. See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The
 Case of Article V, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1990); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/
 Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional
 Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105
 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992) (reviewing Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19).
 279. For an originalist discussion placing primacy on the intentions of the Ratifiers
 rather than the Framers of the Constitution, see Lofgren, supra note 17, at 77.
 280. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 5.
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 to fit have forced him into explicit examinations of, among other matters,
 the Founding, the Civil War and Reconstruction, and the New Deal,
 which for him have been the nation's three most fruitful periods in artic-
 ulating constitutional norms. Put another way, because fit is everything,
 everything must fit, or at least the more that fits the better.
 What matters most, both for Ackerman and for this Article, is the
 Founding. On Ackerman's view, the Founding gave rise neither to a
 "Lockean liberal" regime nor to a civic republican regime, but instead to
 one he sometimes describes as a "dualist democracy" or, significantly, as
 "Neo-Federalism."'281 Ackerman uses these terms to describe a system in
 which two types of decisions are made. One type entails decisions made
 by the government day in and day out, which ultimately derive their au-
 thority from the electoral process. This "normal lawmaking" reflects poli-
 tics grounded mainly, but not exclusively, in individual self-interest. The
 other type of decisionmaking involves judgments of the American people
 during rare moments of national crisis as expressed either through Arti-
 cle V282 or a complex process that serves as Article V's structural counter-
 part. This "higher lawmaking" reflects a more evanescent form of politics
 in which grave challenges to the nation promote greater consideration of
 the common good.283 Ackerman appears clearly sympathetic to dualism
 on normative grounds. More importantly, for him the theory does not
 reflect either an English natural rights philosopher like Locke, nor Conti-
 nental communitarians like Machiavelli, but instead embodies the consid-
 ered judgment of "We the People" of the United States from 1787 to
 1791.284
 Ackerman's historical understanding is more notable for its depth
 than its breadth. He thoroughly discusses the work of a few key histori-
 ans, but only a few. We the People itself, for example, contains short, con-
 sidered essays on Beard, Hartz, Wood, and Pocock, rarities in a work of
 281. Id. at 3-33, 254-65.
 282. Article Five in relevant part provides:
 The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
 propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
 Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
 proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
 Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
 fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
 one or other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
 U.S. Const. art. V.
 283. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 173-79.
 284. In certain senses, Ackerman does not view the Founding as complete until 1804.
 On his account, Jefferson's election in 1800 fine-tuned the Constitution by transforming
 the Presidency from an office predicated on demonstrated public virtue to a post based on
 ideological popularity-a transformation obliquely acknowledged in the Twelfth
 Amendment. Conversely, the Jeffersonians were unsuccessful in attempting to force the
 Federal judiciary to renounce judicial review. See id. at 70-73.
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 constitutional theory.285 Conversely, other historians receive passing ref-
 erence, but frequently no more than that. This problem grows the fur-
 ther Ackerman strays from 1787 itself. In particular, We the People's ex-
 tended discussion of the Revolution, though mostly theoretical rather
 than historical, nonetheless slights such important scholars as Morgan,
 Greene, Reid, and Black. If anything, Ackerman is even more thorough
 yet selective in his treatment of the ever popular The Federalist.286 As is so
 often the case, however, none of the dozens, if not hundreds, of writers
 who debated the Constitution along with "Publius" makes an appearance.
 Off toward the horizon further still are any writings from the Revolution
 or Critical Period out of which "Publian" solutions emerged.
 Not surprisingly, Ackerman's circumscribed rigor cuts in opposite di-
 rections. Along one path, the method renders his specific assertions con-
 vincing within their sphere. He commits no tell-tale factual errors and
 ably supports his reading of one vital work and of certain historiographi-
 cal developments. Along the other path, Ackerman's basic procedure by
 definition renders his use of sources, especially primary materials, more
 limited and so less persuasive than it might be. Likewise, and more signif-
 icantly, the policy of depth over breadth necessarily handicaps Acker-
 man's contextual assertions about the Founding as opposed to his spe-
 cific interpretation of The Federalist. To take one example, critical for
 Ackerman's dualist account is the assertion that "Publius," and the Foun-
 ders generally, believed that constitutional lawmaking could occur only in
 rare periods of national crises during which danger repressed passion.287
 This may be a fair reading of Publius in The Federalist No. 49 (here
 Madison) but, unlike many of Ackerman's other Publian claims, it is a
 controversial interpretation of the Federalist position generally.288 On
 balance, Ackerman's reading does plausibly echo key themes sounded by
 Wood. Still, one passage from one essay in one collection is a shaky foun-
 dation on which to build a major wing of a model constitutional struc-
 ture. Less dramatically, Ackerman's reliance on but a handful of histori-
 ans-though a choice handful-sustains his larger contextual points less
 effectively than he otherwise could, doubly so given his habit of overlook-
 ing work on the Revolution. Too often these kinds of shortcuts signal an
 285. See id. at 25-27 (Hartz), 27-29 (Pocock), 213-21 (Wood), 219-23 (Beard).
 Ackerman also offers similar treatments of Douglass Adair, id. at 223-24, and Martin
 Diamond, id. at 224-27.
 286. The Storrs Lectures provide by far the most rigorous citations. See Ackerman,
 The Storrs Lectures, supra note 273, at 1021-33. In contrast to Sunstein and in stark
 contrast to Epstein, We the People, its precursors, or both, make specific and usually
 thoughtful reference to Numbers 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 28, 31, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 51, 53, 55, 57,
 58, 60, 63, 65, 69, 71, 76, and 78.
 287. Ackerman begins his central discussion of the Founding by speaking of "the
 Founders," but then quickly shifts to talking almost exclusively about The Federalist or
 "Publius." See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 165-99.
 288. See Amar, Consent, supra note 201 (disputing that amendments outside Article
 V are confined to infrequent periods of national crisis).
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 insouciance about historical standards of the type problematic in Sun-
 stein's work and rampant in Epstein's.
 The irony in all this is that Ackerman appears to know better, yet
 chooses not to exploit the advantage. Even his passing references make
 clear that he has surveyed the secondary literature of at least the Found-
 ing more extensively than most contemporary theorists.289 Ackerman's
 general command of secondary material also implies familiarity with pri-
 mary works other than The Federalist, since much of this literature tracks
 an encyclopedic array of contemporary sources closely and explicitly.290
 This evidently wider learning, combined with narrowly applied rigor, sug-
 gests a tactical decision not to "bog down" an already complex account
 with "arcane" detours and specifics.
 The price in terms of historical credibility, though hardly prohibi-
 tive, is needlessly costly. Ackerman's policy of circumscribed thorough-
 ness has left him open to several published criticisms of his historical
 methods which, coming from lawyers, have not exactly been models of
 professional rigor themselves.291 More importantly, it has left him open
 to a degree of unpublished skepticism among legal and constitutional
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 1-19, 144-271.
 290. Gordon Wood's work especially is noted for its dense use of primary source
 quotations within the text. A typical passage reads:
 "An Aged Farmer" of New Jersey in 1770 urged his fellow farmers to stop
 complaining about the gentry's fox-hunting on their land. "Begrudging the
 young Men of [Philadelphia] the Use of this Diversion in our Woods" was
 shortsighted, he said. These gentlemen more than made up for "all the little
 injuries that they may do by Accident, in Pursuit of those noxious Animals," by
 consuming our produce. Who else, he asked, would purchase our watermelons if
 not these gentry? Fox-hunting may have been a "Luxury" as charged, but so were
 watermelons. "They are of no Kind of Use as Food," and yet the gentry "pay us
 some Thousand Pounds a Year" for them. The Jersey farmers were indebted to the
 gentry's luxuries. Being able to dispose of his "Truck" in "the Philadelphia Market
 ... for Cash, without paying. . . Toll for having the Liberty of selling it," was for
 this old Jersey farmer an "Indulgence" that had brought him "much good living
 in my Time," for which he acknowledged his gratitude, "as should also my
 Countrymen, who are mostly under the same Obligations."
 Wood, Radicalism, supra note 13, at 34-35 (citation omitted).
 291. Suzanna Sherry, for example, dismisses Ackerman's "sloppy history" in a fashion
 which itself is conclusory and cites neither Appleby, Bailyn, Morgan, Morris, Reid, Wood,
 nor, for that matter, any other professional historian. Sherry, supra note 278, at 923. To
 take one specific instance, Sherry castigates Ackerman for interpreting The Federalist to
 recommend that "constitutional politics" may often best be conducted through irregular
 mechanisms such as conventions, saying, "[a]bsolutely no evidence exists that Publius was
 speaking of what Ackerman calls 'irregular' constitutional politics as opposed to the formal
 method of amending the Constitution." Id. at 926. Among other things, Sherry's charge
 fails to acknowledge that "the People" had just engaged in exactly such a form of irregular
 constitutional politics, an act that itself echoed earlier irregular acts of constitutional
 change in Anglo-American history. These contextual points may not demonstrate that
 Publius thought no future acts of constitutional lawmaking would take place outside the
 orderly framework of Article V. But they count for something more than "[a] bsolutely no
 evidence." For a further discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying notes
 296-297.
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 historians.292 More significant still, it ironically masks the genuine sub-
 stantive fidelity of Ackerman's dualist account to critical themes in the
 work of historians who themselves looked to reconstruct early American
 constitutional thought and law.
 Ackerman's account passes substantive muster, at least as a prelimi-
 nary matter,293 because it follows how recent historical scholarship has
 reconstructed a distinctively American conception of government that at
 least reconciles, and at most synthesizes, the principal constitutional cur-
 rents evident in the late eighteenth century. In this quest, We the People
 comes down on the side of synthesis, contending that "We the People,"
 for whom the work is named, consciously embraced a new type of consti-
 tutionalism.294 This proposition is debatable yet plausible. Debate has
 proceeded over the question whether any grand understanding, or un-
 derstandings, of government emerge from the thousands of pages of
 early American constitutional discourse. Conversely, generalization does
 not mean reductionism. If recent scholarship suggests anything, it is that
 American constitutional thought, taken as a whole, did undergo discern-
 able shifts from the Revolution to the Critical Period to the Framing, cul-
 minating in what Wood calls a new "American [s]cience of [p]olitics."295
 Beyond the Founding, David Dow likewise chides Ackerman (as well as Akhil Amar)
 for the "abuse of history." Dow, supra note 278, at 46. In particular, Dow challenges
 Ackerman on his interpretations of the Civil War and Reconstruction. By misreading
 Ackerman and focusing on the wrong election, Dow specifically challenges Ackerman's
 contention that certain national elections may signal constitutional politics outside Article
 V. Thus, in one sentence he argues that the 1860 election was too confusing to stand for
 any constitutional point, and in the next criticizes Ackerman for claiming that the nation
 understood the Reconstruction Republicans of the Thirty-Ninth Congress to be engaging
 in constitutional politics. See id. at 51. As Ackerman himself points out, if one is to look at
 any election to figure out popular constitutional understandings in 1866, it is the election
 of 1866. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 93.
 292. I have personally noted informal skepticism about the We the People project
 voiced by some at various legal history conferences and colloquia. Often, however, the
 doubts expressed go not to any discrete point Ackerman has made, but instead voice a
 general concern about keeping legal theorists off historians' "turf." Against this viewpoint
 Ackerman offers a strong rejoinder:
 [A] small, but devoted, band of professional historians . . . are so intent on
 elaborating the vast gulf separating 1787 from 1987 that they verge on
 condemning as unhistorical any suggestion that modem Americans may have
 something to learn about themselves by establishing a meaningful relationship to
 the Founding.... And yet, the fact is that today's constitutional language and
 practice can be traced back to the Founding. Americans will lose a vital resource
 for political self-understanding if we estrange ourselves from these origins.
 Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 166-67. Moreover, historians who have
 looked into the substance of Ackerman's project have been favorable to his approach. See
 infra text accompanying notes 304-309.
 293. "Preliminary" because, as has often been pointed out, the first volume of We the
 People promises more historical detail in the future.
 294. This position is evident at numerous points. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People,
 supra note 19, at 67-70, 165-68.
 295. Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 593-615. Wood concludes Creation, stating:
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 More importantly, Ackerman's account of this conscious synthesis
 concentrates on more than just one constitutional vision or tradition.
 Unlike Epstein, Ackerman acknowledges-even celebrates-the Consti-
 tution's republican pedigree. He does this first in viewing higher lawmak-
 ing as the intended preserve for a periodic politics of civic virtue and
 revolutionary selflessness. As previously described, We the People suggests
 that such periods of "constitutional politics" will be few and far between,
 in part because only times of great national crisis can 'jolt" Americans
 into mass civic activity and public-spirited discourse. As also noted, the
 only primary source Ackerman invokes to support this proposition is The
 Federalist No. 40. But, as should be acknowledged, Ackerman's argument
 receives indirect yet significant support from the work of Wood and Mor-
 gan on the historical synecdoche for constitutional politics, "popular sov-
 ereignty." As these historians have pointed out, early American constitu-
 tionalists eventually hit on the idea that procedurally irregular-even
 extralegal-conventions paradoxically conferred more legitimacy on
 constitutions than legislatures could, in part because their very irregular-
 ity suggested greater civic fervor and representativeness.296 This insight
 helps Ackerman first because irregularity in the abstract suggests infre-
 quency, and second because conventions in this sense had occurred only
 during times of crisis in fact, at least as far as Anglo-American history to
 1787 is concerned. Ackerman, moreover, wisely notes these points.297
 We the People further recognizes the continued legacy of republican
 constitutionalism in considering various Constitutional mechanisms as
 ways to "economize" on virtue even during long stretches of "normal"
 lawmaking. Here Ackerman's work at least partially accords with Sun-
 stein's analysis in arguing that the Federalists utilized an array of devices
 for promoting self-government based upon public-regarding reasons.
 For Ackerman, these devices begin with a scheme of representation that
 gives elected officials "incentives to engage in public-spirited delibera-
 tion...."298 The scheme achieves this goal by multiplying the number
 and nature of representative bodies, casting the House as the guardian of
 So piecemeal was the Americans' formulation of this system, so diverse and
 scattered in authorship, and so much a simple response to the pressures of
 democratic politics was their creation, that the originality and the theoretical
 consistency and completeness of their constitutional thinking have been
 obscured. It was a political theory that was diffusive and open-ended; it was not
 delineated in a single book; it was peculiarly the product of a democratic society,
 without a precise beginning or an ending. It was not political theory in the grand
 manner, but it was a political theory worthy of a prominent place in the history of
 Western thought.
 Id. at 615.
 296. See id. at 306-43; Morgan, supra note 107, at 94-96, 107-13, 267-87.
 297. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 173-79. In an audacious yet
 plausible move, Ackerman moves beyond this point to suggest that Wood himself fails to
 realize that "constitutional politics" reflects an ongoing role for revolutionary/republican
 politics rather than a cynical Federalist manipulation of populist rhetoric. Id. at 219-21.
 298. Id. at 198.
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 "popular opinion," the Senate as the locus for "knowledgeable judg-
 ment," and the President as the embodiment of "energy and decisive-
 ness."299 Further devices to make the most of what public spirit exists
 include separation of powers, which will promote virtuous government by
 insuring that no single institution can claim that it speaks for the nation
 without that claim first being subject to the counterclaims of the other
 branches.300 Finally, judicial review promotes the values of virtuous self-
 government by commanding thatjudges give special weight to the consti-
 tutional choices previously made by popular majorities during times of
 national crisis.301
 While the specifics may be debated, the general theme of economiz-
 ing on virtue itself has the virtue of reflecting central points in current
 scholarship. It corresponds with the thesis that virtuous self-government
 mattered-in fact that it mattered so much it formed the central organiz-
 ing principles of America's first written constitutions. It further reflects
 the thesis that experience showed this organizing principle to be in need
 of important reforms. In these ways, We the People's dualist model ac-
 knowledges that the republican currents that were at flood tide in the
 first round of state constitution-making did not evaporate, but were in-
 stead directed in new ways, however much they ebbed.
 But they did ebb. Unlike Sunstein, Ackerman also stresses that the
 Constitution was launched while new and different currents flooded na-
 tional discourse. These currents, We the People contends, proceeded with
 the profoundly sobering recognition that Americans lacked sufficient
 public spirit to make virtue the sole, or even primary, basis for self-govern-
 ment. Any attempt to do so would only expose individual rights and the
 public good to majoritarian excesses. As Ackerman puts it, "during nor-
 mal times, groups will form on the basis of passion or interest to use state
 power at the expense of the rights of other citizens and the permanent
 interests of the community."302 The constitutional trick therefore be-
 came designing a system that, at least during normal times, would recog-
 nize the electorate's newly discovered penchant for faction and insure
 that rights were placed beyond the reach of majoritarian tyranny. In this
 new, darker light, both unfamiliar and familiar constitutional devices take
 on a different hue. No longer can they be seen solely as mechanisms for
 restoring public-spirited politics pure and simple. Instead, they indicate
 that-again, at least during normal times-neither the national nor the
 state electorates can be trusted entirely. Instead, the very division of con-
 stitutional and normal politics suggests the qualitative superiority of the
 former. Further, devices such as divided representation, separation of
 powers, and judicial review serve as "fail-safe" mechanisms against hope-
 299. Id. at 184.
 300. See id. at 184.
 301. See id. at 191-95.
 302. Id. at 187.
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 fully infrequent yet surely inevitable breakdowns of public-spirited
 politics.303
 In these ways, We the People further situates the Constitution in the
 narrative of early American constitutional development. First, Acker-
 man's work implicitly-or to be accurate, inadvertently-reflects recent
 scholarship on the Revolution, particularly insofar as dualism suggests a
 more structured return to a framework in which concern for both rights
 and self-government coexisted before Independence revealed the deep
 tensions between them. Further, it explicitly acknowledges the now basic
 historical point that the Federalists developed their "new science of poli-
 tics" as a reaction to the excesses of classical republicanism previously
 evident in the state legislatures and in the people who voted for them.
 Dualist democracy thus rests on an appeal to experience that ap-
 pears substantively plausible. In contrast to legal commentators, histori-
 ans themselves have recognized this. Edmund S. Morgan has stated that
 the first volume of We the People "deserves to stand with Beard's . . . as a
 landmark" in constitutional scholarship, which offers "us a fresh and con-
 vincing view ... of our constitutional history."304 Morgan, in fact, goes so
 far as to say that Ackerman's sense of the past is more persuasive than his
 theoretical models.305 In similar though more guarded fashion, Eben
 Moglen allows that "there are profound attractions in Ackerman's [dual-
 ist] resolution," both in terms of the secondary works and The Federal-
 ist.306 Likewise, Richard Bernstein has written that Ackerman's work is
 "ambitious and largely successful."307 This is not to say that these histori-
 ans find no flaws.308 Bernstein nonetheless sums up the views of all three
 historians in stating that "Ackerman . . . uses the materials he draws on,
 303. See id. at 190-95, 198.
 304. Edmund S. Morgan, The Fiction of 'The People," N.Y. Rev. of Books, Apr. 23,
 1992, at 46, 46, 48 (book review).
 305. "Ackerman is much more persuasive in his intuitive recognition of the
 phenomenon [i.e., "We the People" engaging in higher lawmaking] in the past ... [than
 he is] . . . when he proposes a test for successful constitutional politics in our own
 time...." Id. at 48.
 306. Eben Moglen, The Incompleat Burkean: Bruce Ackerman's Foundation for
 Constitutional History, 5 Yale J.L. & Human. 531, 541 (1993) (book review).
 307. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1600.
 308. Morgan states,
 Ackerman, I think, accepts a little too readily Madison's contention that the
 people themselves acted in creating the Constitution. The calling of the
 Constitutional Convention came about without any visible popular demand, its
 members were not popularly elected, and ratification was achieved in the several
 state conventions by dubious means ....
 Morgan, supra note 304, at 48. Moglen contends that "a constitutional history predicated
 on the entire absence of counter-revolutionary elements from Federalist thought [as
 Ackerman's threatens to be] would be as misleading as the Progressive historiography to
 which Ackerman objects." Moglen, supra note 306, at 542. Bernstein notes that
 Ackerman's research strategy is overly "selective." Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1602.
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 however selective his research, with ample sensitivity to their arguments
 and historical contexts."309
 That said, We the People might have put forward an even better sub-
 stantive case had it examined recent scholarship still further. At least two
 general concerns bear mention, each of which arises most clearly in light
 of recent work on the Founding's revolutionary background. For starters,
 Ackerman skimps on what Edward S. Corwin termed "the 'I[h] igher
 [Il]aw' background of American Constitutional law."'310 As a matter of
 theory, We the People has little patience for "natural law" or "right rea-
 son -as a source of constitutional rights or values.311 Of greater rele-
 vance here, still less does the work have any place for natural law as a
 matter of history. Rather, Ackerman attributes to the Federalists a belief
 that vestigial American virtue, marshaled during times of national crisis,
 would suffice to insure that positive higher law that "We the People"
 make would reflect a considered commitment to fundamental values and
 rights. Any strategy for protecting rights outside constitutional politics
 can only be an ahistorical and essentially un-American import.
 But virtuous higher lawmaking may not be all the Federalists be-
 lieved in. As Bailyn pointed out a generation ago, American Whigs
 marched toward revolution with "the law of nature" as one of several ar-
 rows in their quiver.312 Though Reid strongly argues that English consti-
 tutional principles all but eclipsed American reliance on natural law, his
 position has yet to carry the day; nor does Ackerman rely on his work.
 Moreover, it is implausible that natural law dropped out of the picture
 after 1776 any more than republicanism disappeared after 1787. To the
 contrary, reliance on natural law-or something like it-remains a
 theme in scholarship moving past the Revolution. It further appears evi-
 dent in numerous well-known contemporary articulations, including the
 Declaration of Independence,313 Roger Sherman's draft bill of rights,314
 309. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1602.
 310. Corwin, supra note 170, at 85.
 311. Ackerman, for example, concedes that-at least in most cases-the considered
 judgments of "We the People" must be honored even should they prove unpalatable or
 violate tenets derived from rights "foundationalism." Ackerman, We the People, supra
 note 19, at 13-15. For a thorough theoretical critique of this stance, seeJames E. Fleming,
 We the Exceptional American People, 11 Const. Commentary 355 (1994);
 312. See Bailyn, supra note 57, at 26-30.
 313. See The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
 314. Roger Sherman, then a representative from Connecticut, wrote a working draft
 of a Federal Bill of Rights in July 1789. Article 2 declared:
 The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they
 enter into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of
 acquiring property and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and
 publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling
 to consult their common good, and of applying to Government by petition or
 remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not
 be deprived by the Government of the united States.
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 Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull,315 on up to notable opinions by
 Chief Justice Marshall.316 The historical evidence clearly suggests that
 early American constitutionalism relied on natural law traditions in more
 than a trivial way. For all that We the People recognizes the Federalists'
 "liberal" diagnosis of self-interested factionalism during normal times, it
 fails to come to terms with the arguably older "liberal" commitment to
 rights outside any majoritarian decisionmaking process, however infre-
 quent, representative, and virtuous those decisions may be. To the extent
 that We the People ignores this commitment-in failing even to make an
 attempt to discount it-Ackerman's account cannot claim the total "fit"
 to the Founding it seeks.
 Conversely, Ackerman misses a second substantive point that would
 surely help him. As those historians who take American constitutionalism
 most seriously demonstrate, Americans engaged in a rich constitutional
 discourse well before Independence. In this way, Ackerman's account
 overlooks how the Constitution, far from being the American people's
 first break from a previous constitutional regime, was in fact one of a
 series of epic splits. From the patriot constitution's break from the
 emerging English Constitution of parliamentary sovereignty, to the state
 republican constitutions' breaks from the patriot constitution, and only
 then to the Constitution shaped in Philadelphia in 1787, the early
 American people were not strangers to constitutional upheaval. From
 this perspective, Ackerman's scheme of three irregular "constitutional
 moments" becomes less jarring. On examination, that scheme may well
 fit a much longer American tradition.
 Neither of these points, either natural law traditions or pre-Constitu-
 tion constitutionalism, should cloud the overall assessment. In part pro-
 cedurally, more so substantively, the We the People project merits serious
 consideration in its use of history. To the extent that history matters,
 therefore, Ackerman's work further merits consideration normatively, as
 theory. As one historian commented, dualism may even "have interesting
 implications for historical discourse ...."317 Whatever its specific defects
 or whatever will be its eventual revisions, Ackerman's account bears a suf-
 Reprinted in The Rights Retained by the People app. A at 351 (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
 1989).
 315. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); see
 also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Chi. L.
 Rev. 819, 872 (1981).
 316. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 332 (1827) (Marshall,
 C.J., dissenting); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating state
 legislature's recision of previous land grants on the basis of both the Contracts Clause and
 of "general principles which are common to our free institutions"); see alsoJohn P. Roche,
 Natural Law and Contracts inJohn Marshall, Major Opinions and Other Writings, 147-48
 (John P. Roche ed., 1967); James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the
 Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against
 the State, 31 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 421-24 (1982); Nathan Isaacs, Note, Marshall on Contracts:
 A Study in Early American Juristic Theory, 7 Va. L. Rev. 413 (1921).
 317. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1602.
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 ficient "touch of rightness" to serve as a basis for further dialogue be-
 tween past and present constitutionalists.
 CONCLUSION
 No longer must American constitutional thinkers look beyond
 America when seeking insight from the past. Colleagues across the court-
 yard in history departments, by taking the arguments earlier American
 constitutionalists made seriously, and by considering arguments other
 than just those made one summer in Philadelphia, have achieved stun-
 ning success in reconstructing the constitutional discourse that led to
 revolution, to independence, and to the document we live under today.
 The success presents a singular opportunity to modern theorists. Some,
 like Ronald Dworkin, decline the invitation. But many others do not.
 The early returns, at least those considered here, are mixed yet promis-
 ing. Procedurally, they indicate that legal academics themselves may
 never be expected to pursue the often tedious work that keeps historians
 employed. They can and should, however, be expected to do their basic
 homework now that the materials are there for the taking. Substantively,
 the initial results suggest that constitutional theory can neither rest solely
 on a commitment to self-rule or to rights. Early American constitutional
 scholarship indicates to the contrary that the Founders were among the
 first to perceive concretely the conflict between these two values. It there-
 fore no longer seems safe to say that their solution came down exclusively
 on the side of rights, "liberalism," or "autonomy." Yet neither does it ap-
 pear safe to say that their "new science of politics" came down exclusively
 on the side of democracy, "civic republicanism," or "democratic process."
 In avoiding either extreme in substance as well as rhetoric, Bruce Acker-
 man may well be on to something. But whether dualism is sound as
 either history or theory, one thing more seems clear. The work of early
 American constitutional thinkers merits our attention not just because
 they outlined the framework we still follow, nor merely because many
 were brilliant individuals in extraordinary times, but as well because they
 did confront and again can offer a fresh perspective on problems that still
 challenge their modern heirs.
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